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Government Opposes 'Armed Involvement' in B-H

AU0702142494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] At a meeting on 7 February President Zhelyu Zhelev, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov, and Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov discussed current issues of Bulgarian foreign policy. Presidential Spokesman Valentin Stoyanov supplies further details:

[Begin Stoyanov recording] Basic attention was devoted to the visit of Lord Owen and Stoltenberg to Bulgaria and the forthcoming Geneva meeting of the foreign ministers of countries bordering on former Yugoslavia. Bulgaria's position is as follows: It will participate in the meeting only if the foreign ministers of all invited countries participate. The president expressed his doubt whether this meeting could contribute anything to achieving peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially against the background of Saturday's [5 February] massacre in Sarajevo.

It was again pointed out that Bulgaria's position on the situation in former Yugoslavia remains unchanged. Bulgaria opposes any armed involvement in the conflict of Balkan or other countries bordering on former Yugoslavia. In the past other countries joined this position, and recently Greece repeated that it adheres to the same position. [end recording]

Supreme Court Suspends Privatization Dismissals

AU0802104794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] On the basis of its verdict pronounced on 8 February, a five-member panel of the Supreme Court, chaired by Court Deputy Chairman Melkon Melkonyan, has suspended the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria on 16 and 20 December 1993 on dismissing the following members of the Privatization Agency Supervisory Board: Nikola Katsarski, Yonko Kalpazanov, Dimitur Saraivanov, Todor Borilkov, and Lazar Buchvarov.

The Supreme Court established that the Council of Ministers has once more acted illegally by committing a breach of the Constitution and of legal acts. The Council of Ministers has abused its power, which is an inadmissible offense in a rule-of-law state, especially if committed by an organ that is responsible for the comprehensive administration of the country, the Supreme Court's announcement reads.

General Staff Chief Comments on Defense Bill

AU0702193194 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 2 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, by Major Krasen Buchkov; place and date not given: "Champagne for Bill Is Being Chilled"]

[Text] [Buchkov] Mr. Army General, how do you explain the Armed Forces and Defense Bill being adopted at the first reading?

[Petrov] The adoption of the Armed Forces and Defense Bill with a substantial majority is absolutely normal when one takes into consideration the fact that it guarantees the country's security structures—the Bulgarian Army, the Border Troops, the Troops of the Ministry of Transportation, the Construction Troops....

The adoption of the bill was anticipated by all soldiers and our entire public. This is not a secret, narrow departmental bill, but a document of national importance that unites the ideas and visions of the Armed Forces' future.

I was not surprised by the fact that the bill was adopted in an ostensibly rapid manner after constructive debate and discussion. This actually means that the people's representatives have deeply grasped the problems of our national security, skillfully dealt with the specific subject, and precisely and clearly expressed their positions.

[Buchkov] What does the Army gain from the adoption of the Armed Forces and Defense Bill by parliament?

[Petrov] First of all, the bill determines the Armed Forces' place and role as a stabilizing factor in the period of transition and in our democratic civil society. It also guarantees Bulgaria's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Second, the bill ensures the Armed Forces' functional character, structure, and development. It regulates legally the relations between the various organs of the Armed Forces' leadership and improves, to a large degree, the status of the military.

Naturally, the mere act of adopting the bill will not ensure the high social status of the military. However, it is the legal guarantee of the military personnel's security. The military deserve their bill, because they, and indeed, all Bulgarian society, endured a lot until the bill was adopted.

[Buchkov] How do you expect events to develop at the National Assembly during the second reading?

[Petrov] Against the background of the deputies' statements during the first reading, I expect that some of the bill's postulates will significantly improve during the second reading.

[Buchkov] Where do you see the "hazards" of the bill that was adopted at the first reading?

[Petrov] This is a basic bill that determines the general tenets of the Armed Forces' construction. Additional bills will be adopted later on; for example, bills on alternative service, the military personnel's status, the Bulgarian Army, the economic foundations of defense, and so on. At present, the bill has no postulates about the status of military education establishments. This aspect must be clarified. In other words, more bills that spring from the Armed Forces and Defense Bill will be adopted.

[Buchkov] Mr. Army General, is it time to open the champagne bottles?

[Petrov] Not yet. Let it chill. If all goes well, we will soon clink glasses.

Funding Problems Could Ground Air Force

AU0702140794 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 4 Feb 94 p 1

[Emil Mildov report: "One Third of Air Force Aircraft Are Faulty, In 1994 Bulgaria Could Find Itself Without Combat Air Force"]

[Text] The Air Force could stop all flights in 1994 because it does not have enough money to maintain its combat readiness, Lieutenant General Mikho Mikhov, Air Force commander, said on 3 February. He also said that there is a real danger that the accident rate will go up.

By a miracle an accident with the most modern MiG-29 aircraft was avoided last night at Ravnets Airport. The reasons for the near miss—the lack of pilot training and the shortage of spare parts, fuel, and lubricants, Mikho Mikhov said.

The ratio of aviation resources vis-a-vis our neighbors is 1 to 1.6 and even 2.6 to Bulgaria's disadvantage. The combat readiness aircraft are of the second, third, and fourth generations. Only 8 percent of the total number of aircraft are modern aircraft. In neighboring countries the corresponding percentage is 45-50 percent, Gen. Mikhov said. Scheduled repairs were not carried out at the end of 1993 because of a shortage of spare parts. Some 31 percent of the airplanes and 46 percent of the helicopters are faulty.

If the envisaged budget does not provide the Air Force with funds for technical supples, by the end of 1994 some 80 percent of the aircraft will be defective. The Air Force needs a minimum of 4 billion leva. More than 1 billion leva are needed to maintain the missile and antiaircraft troops.

Kenan 'Unmasks' DPS in Talks With Turkish

AU0702194394 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 2 Feb 94 p 2

[Stefan Kostov report: "Kenan Unmasks DPS in Talks With Turkish Politicians"]

[Text] The main goal of my visit to Ankara and Istanbul was to disperse the Turkish political circles' illusions about the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] and its leader Ahmed Dogan, Adem Kenan, leader of the unregistered Turkish Democratic Party, said to STANDART NEWS.

With many clips of Dogan's statements, Mr. Kenan proved his claim that the DPS works against the interests of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. His strongest argument was that the current DPS charter differs significantly from the documents presented to the Turkish and world public when the movement registered.

Adem Kenan visited National Assembly Chairman Necmettin Cindoruk for 18 days, and, he says, succeeded in convincing him not only of Dogan's double game, but also of the fact that the DPS serves only the interests of the former "revivers," and their present day servants—Dogan's circle.

In an open letter, attached to excerpts of his book "Last Strike," and personal talks with leaders of parliamentarian and extraparliamentarian parties, Kenan revealed the grave socioeconomic situation of the Turks in Bulgaria and the continuing ethnocultural obliteration. In statements carried by ORTA DOU, noted politicians supported the mission of Mr. Kenan and his party in saving the Turkish ethnic minority in Bulgaria.

Mr. Kenan expressed his regret that he could not meet Tansu Ciller, however, he was assured that, by 15 May, he will receive an official invitation from the Turkish prime minister.

Mr. Kenan reached an agreement with major business clubs on the allocation of 50 stipends for Bulgarian students interested in studying at Turkish higher education establishments. The sole condition is that they should not be children of participants in the revival process. He added that 55 of the 75 students sent to Turkey by Dogan are children of such parents.

The DPS does not have two charters and Mr. Kenan is manipulating the mass media, Mrs. Sherife Mustafa told STANDART NEWS. According to her, the movement's charter was amended and supplemented at the last national conference. The charter merely specifies the functions of the separate structures and their leaders.

Czechs Not To Support Air Strikes in Bosnia

LD0802092894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0600 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Vondra has said that aerial strikes against Bosnia are an extreme measure. Speaking on Czech Television, he said that, although the attack is possible, the Czech Republic does not plan to render its support in this respect.

Klaus Talks About Davos, European Integration

AU0702191994 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 5 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Martin Danes in Prague; date not given: "European Integration Is Not Just a Matter of Institutions"]

[Text] [Danes] What was the most important thing you brought back from the World Economic Forum held in Davos last weekend?

[Klaus] Two things: On the one hand, the feeling that people know about the Czech Republic and that what they know about it are positive things. And, on the other, the observation that puts my previous statement into the correct context: that we are not at the center of the world, that there are a great many extraordinarily interesting and stimulating things going on in the world, and that it is necessary to listen carefully to other people.

[Danes] In your speech in Davos, you emphasized the differences between the individual countries in Europe before their current integration. According to some observers, including those in the West, by placing such an emphasis on the differences, you are damaging our republic's starting position for its gradual incorporation into the European Union. Are they not right?

[Klaus] First of all, I do not know if the formulation of your question—"emphasized the differences"—is correct. I emphasized something else. I said that, if we analyze Europe's current development—when I say "Europe," I do not mean the abstract continent but the flesh-and-blood people who live in it—we have to be careful that we adjoin its success or failure to factors that really gain recognition for it and that, on the contrary, we do not adjoin factors to it that do not gain recognition for it. I said that the fundamental reason for West Europe's success in recent decades has been the social system in these countries and not this or that supranational institution that lumps Europe together. I cited the example that our tragedy was not CEMA but the communist regime. This is also valid symmetrically vice versa.

[Danes] This is valid symmetrically vice versa for what?

[Klaus] Even in West Europe, the dominant factor was not the influence of the European integrative process but maintaining a free system based economically on private ownership and so on. This conclusion applies to the past, the present, and certainly the future—that is, I was not reproaching anyone in my speech. It was merely an attempt to analyze the factors that influence the current situation in Europe. We can then discuss what percentage share this additional influence—that is, the establishment of external integration—has had, apart from the aforementioned dominant influence, in Europe's success.

[Danes] Nevertheless, our state certainly desires integration with the European Union....

[Klaus] Our state, in any case, wants to integrate with Europe and merge with Europe in all possible structures. Undoubtedly, to achieve this, it is necessary to enter into European institutions and organizations. However, I can integrate myself institutionally and noninstitutionally. For example, I can do so economically by abolishing customs barriers and all sorts of obstacles to trade. Another possibility is that I will integrate myself on an organizationally institutional sphere, but this is only one method.

[Danes] According to press reports, in Switzerland you also admitted to the possibility of our budget policy's transition from a neutral to an active one. In your opinion, when should a change of this order take place? Is it intended to take the wind from Milos Zeman's sails before he had even gathered it?

[Klaus] No, I must disappoint you. I never said anything of the kind. This was merely a figment of the imagination of some editor or commentator concerning my speech to Swiss bankers on Monday [31 January] evening in Wolfsberg. Perhaps this editor got hold of the German text of my speech. It contained a written addendum, which I did not refer to in my speech. This was a theoretical analysis of the kind of economic situation in which budget policy has to be restrictive, neutral, and expansive. It says there that no East European country has yet reached the stage at which it could transfer to an expansive policy, regardless of whether this makes any sense at all. It is still my opinion that an expansive budget policy does not make any sense.

[Danes] As chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, are you worried about competition from the right? I am referring to the newly evolving party, whose ranks include, among others, the publisher of CESKY DENIK, Josef Kudlacek.

[Klaus] I am really not worried about this competition. These people are not interested in integrating the right wing, as they falsely dub their political venture. They are merely interested in making a name for themselves and in asserting their very extreme view of our current situation. If they succeed for a while in uniting a couple of people from various political parties, people who in our already maturing political spectrum have always remained ostentatiously in lilliputian parties of absolutely negligible significance, let them do so. I have absolutely nothing to add to this.

[Danes] Do you think they have any hope of getting into parliament?

[Klaus] In my opinion, certainly not.

Klaus on Full Convertibility of Koruna

AU0702175994 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 4 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci in Prague; date not given: "A Firm Exchange Rate Is the Axis of Our Transformation"]

[Text] [Krejci] Could you explain, concretely and simply, why you think the Czech Republic should not hasten to implement the full convertibility of the koruna?

[Klaus] This is one of the many topics in which—I do not know why—correspondents get the feeling that they could find another chink of disagreement between politicians. I proclaim that, for the economic part of the government,, and also for the state banks and other institutions, this is not a matter-of-fact dispute. We are conducting a detailed study of the requirements for this step and the most suitable time to implement it.

There is absolute convertibility without any restrictions in few places—perhaps only in Hong Kong. All other countries have some form of regulation. So, progress from one phase of convertibility to another is simply relative and continuous and has nothing to do with political symbolism.

[Krejci] What are the advantages and disadvantages of such a step?

[Klaus] It goes without saying that the introduction of full convertibility has certain advantages, but it also has some disadvantages. There are three disadvantages, for which a gradual approach is necessary: First, the axis of our entire economic transformation is secured economically by a firm nominal exchange rate and by maintaining this exchange rate as the Archimedes point of the whole economic system. On the other hand, implementing full convertibility requires that this idea be abandoned and that a flexible exchange rate be introduced.

Second, introducing full convertibility means, to a certain extent, losing the autonomous nature of the state's monetary and financial—that is, macroeconomic—policy. This is fine in cases in which a country lags far behind the general liberal tendencies of its neighboring partners, and the world drags it from its inadequate foundation to somewhere else. This, however, does not apply to our country. Our monetary and financial policy is quite deliberate, quite rational, and does not have to be "disciplined" by our neighbors. The situation is rather the reverse. Moreover, the policy of our neighbors may have its own logic, different from that of our country, which has, at the moment, different tasks than standard European states.

And, finally, third: Introducing full convertibility indeed means exposing ourselves too much in the sense that we would enter into the realm of rapid movements of speculative capital that flees from one country to another, where it seems that the interest rate conditions are a little better. This is an instability that our transforming economy can do without at the moment.

[Krejci] What must be done now in this regard?

[Klaus] Other aspects of the concept of convertibility must gradually be liberated. Liberalizing what the citizen may exchange is also, undoubtedly, associated with this. The task is to create an attractive and pleasant environment for foreign investors, who now have the possibility to transfer money back to their own countries.

Therefore, I do not see a preponderance of reasons for immediately dealing with full convertibility. Additional analyses indicate that we are talking about a medium to long-term program.

Foreign Ministry Denounces Sarajevo Attack

LD0802145494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic today issued a statement on the criminal attack on the Sarajevo market. In its statement, the ministry strongly denounces such deliberate attacks, whichever of the fighting sides is their originator.

At the same time, the Foreign Ministry appeals to the UN secretary general and the UN Security Council to adopt more radical measures to speed up the solution to the situation on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is becoming unbearable both politically and from the humanitarian point of view.

The Slovak Republic will continue to assist in the search for a peaceful solution to the war conflict on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia in accordance with the extent of its possibilities, says the statement issued by the Foreign Ministry.

Meciar on Coalition Talks, Opposition Moves

LD0702183994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] During coalition talks in Bratislava today, Vladimir Meciar, the prime minister and chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, called on Ludovit Cernak, the chairman of the Slovak National Party [SNS], to resign from the post of deputy chairman of the National Council. He justified this by saying that Mr. Cernak had refused to give guarantees that he would coordinate the parliament's session on 16 February in a way that would ensure a joint action by all coalition members.

Speaking at a news briefing, the prime minister went on to say that representatives of the opposition held talks on methods of turning the discussion on the big privatization bill into an immediate political solution and noted that they would express a lack of confidence in Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic. This failed to happen only because the Party of the Democratic Left rejected it, Vladimir Meciar added.

SNS Honorable Chairman Jozef Prokes confirmed the prime minister's statement that they proposed an open coalition [otvorena koalicia] to the Party of the Democratic Left [PDL]. He said the response of PDL representatives was slightly negative but not altogether dismissive.

Moravcik Presents Foreign Policy Report

AU0802100194 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 3 Feb 94 p 3

[First installment of Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik's report to parliament on 2 February: "Slovakia in the World"]

[Text] *For the first time ever, a report on the independent Slovak Republic's foreign policy has been delivered in the National Council of the Slovak Republic. We consider this document to be historic and have therefore decided to publish the full text of it. It was by Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik.*

Evaluation of the Fulfillment of Slovak Foreign Policy in 1993

In 1993, the Slovak Republic established itself as an entity under international law. In the first year of its independent existence, the Slovak Republic has successfully become party to all of the important international organizations and agreements, as permitted by the conditions and the situation that arose after the partition of Czechoslovakia. In the course of the year, we have succeeded in defining the interests and priorities of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy and in gradually presenting ourselves as an equal-right partner on the international scene. These facts create favorable prerequisites for the Slovak Republic's foreign policy in 1994.

1. The Sphere of Multilateral Cooperation

1.1 Slovak Foreign Policy in the Security Sphere

The unequivocal definition of the Slovak Republic's orientation on security matters and drafting a concept in that sphere has been one of the most important results of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy in 1993.

The Slovak Republic is not able to secure its security through its own forces. This is why Slovakia began to seek security guarantees at the very beginning of its establishment. Slovakia unequivocally sees the guarantee for its own security in West European security structures, and it seeks the optimal ways of integrating itself into them.

In the European security system that is being established, there are several entities of different importance and weight. NATO is the most efficient security organization in Europe. The process of the Slovak Republic's rapprochement with NATO is a long-term process involving many aspects. This process fits harmoniously into the process of establishing a new European security system.

The basic steps and measures that are inevitable for the Slovak Republic's integration into the North Atlantic Alliance (NAA) are detailed in the Project of the Slovak Republic's Rapprochement with NATO. A commission comprising members of the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and Finance Ministry participated in drafting this project.

NATO and the Western European Union [WEU]

The Slovak Republic regards extending its activities in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and participating in the NATO program for Central and East Europe as the most important element of its rapprochement with NATO. Slovakia's efficient engagement in NACC activities have resulted in its participation in the work of the Political Committee, the Economic Committee, and an ad hoc peacekeeping group. The Slovak Republic's charge d'affaires in Brussels has regularly participated in NACC meetings at an ambassadorial

level. At the end of 1993, Slovakia intensified its contacts with NATO, particularly with the aim of influencing the final shape of the Partnership for Peace plan.

In 1993, the parliamentary aspect of cooperation with NATO intensified. The Slovak Republic, as an observer, began regularly and actively to participate in North Atlantic Alliance meetings.

The intensification of the contacts on all of the levels represents yet more evidence of improving cooperation between NATO and the Slovak Republic. In the course of 1993, Slovak Republic representatives at the highest level visited NATO. The president's and the prime minister's visit to NATO has finally dispersed worries about our security orientation and its nature. NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner received the Slovak deputy prime minister and the foreign minister on the occasion of the European Community Three meeting with the Visegrad Four countries.

The contacts of the Slovak Republic's representatives within the NACC are also universal. Between 8 and 29 March 1993, there was an NACC meeting at the level of defense ministers. The participants in the meeting gave their opinions on NACC activities since the previous meeting of defense ministers; discussed defense-related problems linked to peacekeeping operations, which were conducted on the basis of a document drafted by the NACC ad hoc group; and gave their opinions on the possibility of further cooperation in the sphere of security. On 11 June 1993, there was an NACC meeting on the level of defense ministers in Athens. On 17 July 1993, A. de Francis, NATO first deputy secretary general, received the Slovak foreign minister during his visit to Brussels. On 3 December 1993, there was an NACC meeting on the level of defense ministers in Brussels.

Several high NATO officials visited the Slovak Republic in 1993. J. Shalikashvili, supreme commander of NATO troops in Europe, visited Slovakia. In Bratislava, a staff meeting between the Slovak Defense Ministry and a NATO SHAPE delegation took place with the aim of evaluating the level of mutual cooperation and finding ways to improve it. On this basis, the plan for cooperation between the Slovak Defense Ministry and NATO SHAPE has been drafted for 1994. From the viewpoint of searching for the optimal forms of cooperation, the visit to Slovakia by Dr. E.v.C. Bruce, NATO director of press and information, was an important event.

In the fall of 1993, W. van Eekelen, the WEU general secretary, visited the Slovak Republic and met with the president, the prime minister, and the foreign minister.

The visit of the NAA secretary general to the Slovak Republic on 15 November 1993 helped to develop relations between the NAA and the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

The Slovak Republic, however, still does not have specialized diplomatic representation in NATO in Brussels. The task of securing cooperation with NATO and the WEU has been fulfilled by our mission in Brussels and the Slovak Permanent Mission at the WEU.

CSCE

The Slovak Republic's course of action during the CSCE meetings in Vienna in 1993 was based on Resolution 980, approved by the Slovak Republic Government on 22 December 1992. The activity and contacts with the U.S. Department of Defense, the Defense Ministries of Sweden and Italy, and the CSCE general secretary have helped to efficiently establish the Slovak Republic within the CSCE. The Slovak Republic's Permanent Mission in Vienna has considerably contributed to this establishment.

One of the first tasks of Slovak diplomacy within the CSCE was to dispel worries about the status of the Hungarian ethnic minority living in Slovakia. The partition of the former Czechoslovakia has been used to dramatize the situation. The mission that visited Slovakia as a new CSCE country in March 1993 confirmed that the Slovak Republic had fulfilled the obligations it had toward the CSCE and ethnic minorities. The mission also stated that the transition toward a market economy and pluralist democracy and respect for human rights were satisfactory in the Slovak Republic. These processes have not been discontinued since the partition of Czechoslovakia. The mission's conclusions have also contributed to lower tension surrounding the ethnic minorities issue. According to the mission, there are opportunities for improving the legal status of the minorities in Slovakia, but, in general, the mission has not discovered any signs of tensions or hostility between various ethnic groups.

The mission of the CSCE High Commissioner for Human Rights has similar results. In the interests of reducing tension in that sphere, making the situation clear, and building mutual trust, the Slovak side proposed, on the initiative of the Slovak prime minister, the establishment of an impartial group of CSCE experts to examine the status of the Hungarian ethnic minority in the Slovak Republic and the status of the Slovak ethnic minority in Hungary, and the overall ethnic policies of the two countries.

We consider the acceptance of our proposal to establish a group of experts from other countries as a success for Slovak diplomacy. This was something new in the CSCE's attitude toward solving problems related to the status of ethnic minorities and in the CSCE concept of preventive diplomacy. For the first time, the CSCE is taking preventive steps in a situation where there is no open conflict or center of tension.

Our membership in the coordinating CSCE Three and our participation in important activities, mainly in the sphere of preventive diplomacy, have helped the Slovak Republic to establish itself within the CSCE. Our activity in the Three, consultations on the higher ministerial level, participation in CSCE missions and in the decisionmaking process, plus our fulfillment of all of our obligations, helped the Slovak Republic to obtain its proper position.

We can mention several of the most important activities in which the Slovak Republic participated as a member of the Three: the meeting between the Three and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, consultations with the top officials of the Council of Europe and the United Nations about problems of human dimensions, the meeting with ZRJ [expansion unknown] officials in Stockholm on extending the CSCE mandate in former Yugoslavia, and the ministerial meeting of the CSCE Council on further improving CSCE activity. Moreover, Slovak diplomats participated in Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas's mission in Central Asian and Transcaucasian countries on the level of high commissioners, and in the intelligence mission in Macedonia commissioned in connection with Macedonia's admission to the CSCE.

At meetings of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, the goal of which was to strengthen cooperation between CSCE member countries on security and to reduce the risk of new conflicts in the region, the Slovak Republic has built on the activity of the former CSFR and has become a coauthor of the proposal to draft new measures to strengthen trust and security and to harmonize the obligations adopted on military security in the previous period, and a coauthor of the joint proposal by 24 countries on the nonproliferation of arms and the control of their transfer. The Slovak foreign minister spoke at a plenary meeting of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna on 29 September 1993.

One of the most important roles of the Slovak delegation at the Vienna meetings dealing with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty [CFE] and the Open Skies Treaty was to ensure the Slovak Republic's successorship as regards both treaties. The countries that signed the CFE Treaty approved at an extraordinary conference on 5 February 1993 the division of the former CSFR's obligations between the two successor countries. The Slovak Republic's successorship in the Open Skies Treaty, which creates conditions for building the trust by observing the military activities of the CSCE countries, was confirmed on the plenary meeting of the signatories on 3 May 1993.

The Slovak Republic has also participated in the meeting of the Consultative Committee of the CSCE Center for Preventing Conflicts, whose importance, however, has significantly declined with the progress of CSCE institutionalization. The task of the Forum for Consultations on Security Issues was transferred onto the newly established Vienna Group of CSCE Committee of High Commissioners.

Meciar Urges Cernak To Give Up Assembly Post

LD0702175694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Representatives of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Slovak National Party [SNS] held coalition talks in the Slovak Parliament today. Answering journalists' questions regarding what happened at the roundtable meeting, [SNS Chairman] Ludovit Cernak said, and I quote, you will be informed by the well-tested pair [Meciar-Prokes]. Afterward, journalists were addressed at a short news briefing by [HZDS Chairman] Vladimir Meciar and Jozef Prokes [SNP honorary chairman and deputy speaker of Slovak parliament].

[Begin Meciar recording] The main issue we addressed was whether Mr. Cernak, as SNS chairman, still feels personally committed to the coalition agreement between the HZDS and SNS. The other issue was whether he was willing to coordinate actions at the [parliament's] plenary session on 16 February so as to ensure our [SNS and HZDS coalition] joint behavior and actions. He answered that the only thing he was willing to follow was purely his conscience.

I personally urged him to step down from the post of deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic because the only reason for his holding this post is that, as a coalition, we agreed to render political support to him. In this situation, the HZDS is unable to support Mr. Cernak's remaining in the post of deputy chairman of the National Council. He replied that [word indistinct] if we think we have enough votes to recall him, we should go for it.

We also asked whether it [Cernak's faction in the SNS] was ready to respect the unity of the deputies' club, thus specifying our willingness to talk only to those representatives delegated by the SNS. We received a negative answer.

Given these circumstances, the HZDS will continue to ensure that agreed coalition undertakings are fulfilled. It pledges to support the SNS as [?a whole]. We are interested in the SNS being a strong partner. We will be coordinating our actions in the National Council with all those who want to coordinate their actions with us. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Begin Prokes recording] It is questionable at the present time whether Mr. Cernak, as deputy chairman of the National Council, represents the SNS because the SNS Central Council clearly voiced a lack of confidence in him. That is one aspect of the matter.

The other aspect is that all of the deputies, including those siding with Mr. Cernak, were asked to take part in joint talks with the HZDS and the SNS [deputies'] club. None of them took part in these talks, however. Thus, the issue of whether this group actually intends to respect coalition agreements was the correct issue to raise. I think that the SNS assembly scheduled for 19 February will unequivocally resolve this question. After all, SNS district conferences have indicated a certain solution to this issue. But, in any case, I think that once there is a partnership, problems should be discussed internally rather than passing them to the mass media. [end recording]

Foreign Minister Cited on Lifting Sanctions

LD0702192894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] [Announcer] We begin our reports with developments in the Yugoslav crisis at home and abroad. [Hungarian Foreign Minister] Geza Jeszenszky, who visited Serbia a few days ago, talked about the Yugoslav situation this afternoon at a news conference. Miklos Lengyel reports:

[Lengyel] Hungary supports the lifting of sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia only if Belgrade meets international expectations, Geza Jeszenszky emphasized at his press briefing today. The Hungarian foreign minister said that pressure on the Hungarian minority in Serbia had eased. Hungary was striving for balanced relations with all successor states to Yugoslavia.

The Hungarian foreign minister also plans to visit Zagreb and Sarajevo soon. Geza Jeszenszky thinks there is still a chance of finding some sort of peace solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, Geza Jeszenszky considered it regrettable that Istvan Szentivanyi, an Alliance of Free Democrats deputy, had criticized the foreign minister's Belgrade talks. He was surprised that THE WASHINGTON POST had only belatedly commented on his visit to Belgrade. He denied that the Hungarian Government had only now mentioned the detrimental effects of the sanctions on Hungary. If the sanctions did not work properly, it was not Hungary's fault, Geza Jeszenszky said.

Jeszenszky Replies to Slovak Accusations

AU0402162694 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 4 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Peter G. Feher; place and date not given: "In Spite of All This, We Would Like Good Relations With Slovakia—Reply to the Accusations"]

[Text] On 2 February in the Bratislava Parliament, Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik made a speech. He summed up his country's 1993 diplomatic results and spoke about Slovakia's foreign relations. In the course of this, he blamed Hungary a number of times for the tensions between the two countries, and for the open issues that hinder the establishment of good relations. We asked Geza Jeszenszky to reply to the accusations of his Slovak colleague.

[Feher] Moravcik accused Hungary of being responsible for the atmosphere of mistrust between the two states. Does this indicate some kind of negative change in Slovak foreign policy, or is it part of the already existing process?

[Jeszenszky] The Slovak foreign minister made propagandistic statements. We could term his words as some kind of self-deceit. I am convinced that history will clearly prove that his accusations had no basis.

However, we do not have time to wait for the historians to make their appropriate judgment over Moravcik's statements because, in the interest of adequately informing the populations of the two countries and the international community, this kind of approach has to be calmly, but firmly refused. It is the facts that fundamentally disprove the Slovak foreign minister's views. Since the time it became clear that the Czech Republic and Slovakia would separate, Hungary has made many gestures toward both countries. We have paid special attention to the newly established Slovak state. Our historic coexistence, the 600,000 Hungarians living in Slovakia, the longest section of our border, regional politics, and economic viewpoints all dictate good bilateral relations. I would like to remind people that I held a lecture on Slovak-Hungarian conciliation on 3 September 1992, which was received positively. Prime Minister Meciar's invitation to Hungary and his visit took place after this. During the Budapest talks, [former Prime Minister] Jozsef Antall brought it to Meciar's attention that Hungary has cordial intentions with its northern neighbor, however, in two issues the Hungarian stance cannot be changed: We cannot accept the unlawful diversion of the Danube, and we have to insist on settling the situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia in the spirit of the international norms and recommendations. We suggested further talks on both issues. We wanted joint committees to be set up, and raised the possibility of an agreement on the protection of national minorities. (This would have been an agreement similar to the one we had made with Slovenia). Slovakia was not prepared for cooperation on these issues. As we know, the Danube was diverted, and Moravcik's latest statement on this issue is not accurate, because he said that, due to the European Union's mediation, the political antagonism between the two countries ceased to exist and it has been turned into a legal dispute. Only after defeating the Slovak Government's long resistance did Hungary manage to achieve that the European Union's mediation and The Hague Court's jurisdiction would be used. Therefore, it can be seen that, even in the case of a serious violation of the law, Hungary strived to settle the issue through negotiations, within a legal framework.

[Feher] In his aforementioned parliamentary speech, the Slovak foreign minister accused Hungary, among other things, of damaging Slovakia's situation by overemphasizing the Hungarian national minority problems at international forums. Slovakia, as a member of many international organizations, accepted as obligations the recommendations regarding national minorities. In this case, what is the basis for Moravcik's accusations?

[Jeszenszky] Hungary could have hampered Slovakia's acceptance into the various international organizations. The best known example is probably Slovakia's membership in the Council of Europe. As is known, Hungary deliberately did not hinder its admittance, because we did not want to lay more burdens on bilateral relations. When Slovakia was established and when it was to be admitted to various international institutions, we did indicate our concerns regarding its policy on national minorities. In Slovakia, there is a language law that is not

at all favorable to the national minorities, and the national minorities have serious reservations regarding the Slovak Constitution. Even the European Community stated at the time that the full observation of national minority rights is one of the preconditions for recognizing new states. Therefore, Hungary did not initiate this issue on its own, rather, this is an international system of requirements. Hungary was not just imagining things when Slovakia's Council of Europe membership came up: It became obvious that two new measures were threatening the Hungarian minority. These are the transformation of the schooling system and the reform of public administration, which would put the Hungarian minorities in a very disadvantageous position.

[Feher] In his parliamentary speech, Moravcik claimed that the drafting of the bilateral basic agreement was in process and, on the Slovak side, nothing was standing in the way of signing this document as soon as possible. Is the drafting of the bilateral basic agreement indeed so far forward?

Jeszenszky] Unfortunately, I cannot confirm this, and the obstacles are not posed by the Hungarian side; the real problem is that the settlement of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is indeed a prerequisite for signing such an agreement—in the spirit, let us say, of the often mentioned Recommendation No. 1201 of the Council of Europe. If this was implemented in Slovakia and the measures that are to the detriment of the Hungarian minority are not introduced, then Slovakia's practice would be suitable for all affected sides. The agreement could refer to the desired principles and practices in an adequate form. Therefore, if the situation of the Hungarian minority is settled in the spirit of the recommendations accepted by the international community, then a bilateral agreement can be signed as soon as the following day.

FIDESZ Official on Liberal Bloc, Elections

AU0802110094 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 5 Feb 94 p 6

[Interview with Jozsef Szajer, chairman of the National Committee of the Federation of Young Democrats, FIDESZ, by Anita Elo; place and date not given: "According to Szajer, the Agreement With the Alliance of Free Democrats Is Not in Danger—The FIDESZ's Goal Is To Replace the Coalition and To Defeat the Socialists"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Elo] Four years ago, you firmly opposed the government's policies. Has the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] or the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] changed since then?

[Szajer] If we compare [FIDESZ Chairman] Viktor Orban's budget speeches, we can see that the 1993 speech was a much tougher criticism of the government than the 1990 one. Presumably, in 1990, the press more markedly emphasized that it was a speech in opposition to the government.

[Elo] We can hear the FIDESZ mentioned together with the MDF increasingly frequently. Does this mean that you are starting to befriend the party in power? Is it a gradual withdrawal from the opposition role?

[Szajer] Anyone who, three months before the elections, expects to get into power through the MDF is making a miscalculation. Hungarian citizens will have this government coalition replaced at the next elections. It can only harm us if we are seen to be on the same platform as the MDF. What would be the point in befriending a party in power that will only last a few weeks or months?

[Elo] Then what is the reason for the change? I do not suppose you want to attribute this to the media's manipulations....

[Szajer] No, I do not, but somehow it has become a public view, although there is no basis for it.

[Elo] Let me remind you of Orban's mental experiment when he drew the picture of a coalition to be formed with the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and the MDF.

[Szajer] In Hungary, it is accepted that a so-called social-liberal coalition will have to be formed after the elections. All Orban said was that at least another five other versions are also possible and the coalition possibilities should not be predetermined.

[Elo] Nevertheless, this means that you would also enter into a coalition with the most criticized government parties. Do you not feel this as a significant shift in the FIDESZ's policies?

[Szajer] The FIDESZ's goal continues to be to replace the current government coalition and to end up in front of the socialists. This was our goal in 1990, but we did not manage to achieve it. We are criticizing the MDF government just as firmly and severely as in 1990. In 1993, a new element was added with the increase of the socialists' chances to get into government. We are very strongly criticizing several elements of the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] policies because, in the future, they can be detrimental to the country, and we cannot forget about past experiences, either. At the same time, I can perceive a shift to the left in public opinion; therefore, someone who remains in the same place appears to be moving to the right. [passage omitted]

[Elo] The liberal bloc has not even made its election agreement and conflicts have already surfaced. In fact, some people even think that the FIDESZ's agreement with the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] is in danger.

[Szajer] We initiated this agreement a year ago. We have always had some friction between the two parties and will always have them since we are two independent organizations. [passage omitted]

[Elo] What can the FIDESZ expect from cooperation with the Agrarian Federation and the Entrepreneurs' Party?

[Szajer] Through this, the liberal bloc almost covers the whole society. The FIDESZ has a disposition of a people's party and it can talk to the country's citizens regardless of which strata of society they belong to. The SZDSZ mainly has a basis among the intelligentsia. The Entrepreneurs' Party represents a very important group in the economic change of the regime, and the fourth is an agrarian party. [passage omitted]

Daily Views 'Conflicts' in Ruling Coalition

WS0702164594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Ewa Kaszuba and Ewa K. Czaczkowska: "Day After Day Toward the Crisis"]

[Text] Conflicts within the governing coalition started even before the government was formed; with varied intensity, they persisted through the 100 days of governing. However, none of them shook the coalition as hard as the last one.

Overheard Near the Door

As a consequence of the seriousness of the conflict and the gravity of the accusations leveled at one another by the politicians of both coalition parties, the last session of the Chief Council [RN] of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] was held behind closed doors; journalists were not admitted. However, fragments of statements that could be made out in the corridor suggested that the participants were expressing severe criticism of the peasant [Polish Peasant Party (PSL)] partner.

Aleksander Kwasniewski admitted that the main shortcoming of the prime minister is the fact that he is not acting in line with the coalition agreements and that he is unable to communicate with the mass media. The cadre policy that the PSL is carrying out was termed by him as a "buddies" policy. As he later repeated officially, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] has so far proposed eight candidates for the posts of voivodes and deputy voivodes; among them, only one person was a member of the party's leadership; the others were experts. The 22 appointments that were made at the motion of the PSL concerned people chosen from among the PSL party apparatus.

Kwasniewski argued that the conflicts must not be left as they are, so both partners and the public will not be led to the conclusion that there is no problem at all; a similar situation might repeat itself in several weeks or more.

Deputy Prime Minister Marek Borowski said that economic policy entails a look into the future; it also requires a clear statement of what kind of policy the government wants to pursue. However, on this there are differences between the coalition parties.

According to Borowski, the PSL fulfills the role of a brake in the government by demanding the time to think things over. Now the problem is that there is no time because the atmosphere in the West is once again favorable to Poland, and new possibilities for obtaining foreign capital are opening up. One cannot be suspicious, the deputy prime minister said; one cannot review every single law every three months and correct provisions that are world standards. It is also intolerable that the coalition's deputies introduce and vote on amendments that distort bills submitted by the government.

Emphasizing that PSL policy is currently, to a considerable degree, catering to the needs of its own electorate, Borowski gave a few examples of decisions favoring the inhabitants of rural areas, such as great subsidies for the Agency for Agricultural Marketing [ARR], amendments to the Law on ARR, the Law on Compensatory Fees, and raises in old age pensions, which will primarily benefit farmers. Out of the 5 trillion zlotys [Z] earmarked for this year's raises, Z4 trillion will be received by them.

Even though he admitted that indeed the situation should not be aggravated, Borowski said that submitting conditions is different from offending a partner. He believes that the best solution would be if the PSL accepted the five conditions submitted by himself and the SLD, if it adopted the budget without tampering with its provisions; the peasants should also unblock the National Investment Funds so mass privatization could finally begin. Only then could the details be discussed.

The statements of both politicians were extensively commented on in the corridor. Some people in the corridor pointed out that the present conflict was brought on by excessive submission toward the PSL, which, they said, was the fault of Kwasniewski.

"If we let the peasants fill the post of the voivode in Wloclawek, it is clear that anything can be done to us," they said.

Members of the SdRP leadership did not conceal the fact that the proposal that all decisions be made by the government's Presidium was prompted by the need to watch the prime minister's hands. SLD politicians said the same during the coalition talks. The signing of agreements and appendixes was a consequence of the fact that, even in the previous Sejm, the PSL and its leader were well known for violating their agreements. The coalition also wants to keep a tighter rein on Michal Strak, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], by holding consultations concerning the filling of the positions of voivodes and deputy voivodes. As one politician conceded, the appetites of the URM head are enormous; however, one should rather not think about it in terms of one's own party or even in terms of the coalition but in much broader terms.

Conflicts, Disputes, and Understatements

Frictions that posed serious threats to the coalitions began as early as the day that was supposed to end the talks on the final shape of the Pawlak Cabinet. When, after over a month of coalition talks, everyone, both politicians and journalists, sighed with relief that we already had a government, it turned out that it was too early. The list with the names of the ministers that the prime minister brought to the Belweder was contrary to the earlier agreements. The SLD politicians threatened to break the coalition; Pawlak had to yield. The "bone of contention" was the Finance Ministry, which, along with the portfolio of the deputy minister, was given to Marek Borowski, as well as the Ownership Transformations Ministry, which was taken over by Wieslaw Kaczmarek.

These two politicians with "liberal" views on the economy were not welcomed by the PSL. The crisis ended when both sides signed an appendix to the coalition agreement. This appendix was not observed, which caused the latest conflict.

What Will Happen Next With the Coalition?

Before the government was sworn in, the coalition was quite considerably rocked by the election of the chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee. It is not known whether this conflict was caused by the disloyalty of coalition partners or by the fact that the agreement was not very clear. PSL leaders officially did not pay great attention to this, but the deputies began to express strong doubts about the intentions of the SLD; they started to ask: "What will happen next with the coalition?"

The same question was asked unofficially in the Sejm when the SLD Deputies' Club did not take part in discussions on the "New Year's" speech by the prime minister. The speech was not favorably received by the SLD; its deputies wondered why it had been delivered at all at that time. They argued that, among other things, the condition of the economy was depicted rather subjectively in the speech.

The coalition was also not really unanimous in the ballots on the acceptance of accounts of the Oszewski and the Suchocka governments. According to Kwasniewski, the discussion and the ballots were exclusively political, not substantive acts.

Assistant or Spokesman

The government's information policy caused a serious misunderstanding as well. The appointment of Ewa Wachowicz to the post of press secretary did not bring about an enthusiastic response from the SLD, which wanted the prime minister to have a press spokesperson. Negative opinions of politicians and journalists on the information policy of the government forced the SdRP Presidium to forward a letter to the prime minister and ask that a concept of information policy be adopted.

Dispute Over Voivodes

For a long time, it seemed that, if the issue of the filling of voivode posts might cause a split in the coalition, it would be not because of its appetites for the same voivodships but because of the attitude toward the need to replace voivodes in general. When, before the government was sworn in, Michal Strak spoke about the need to adjust the political map of voivodships to the election results, SLD politicians either tried to calm the situation or did not say anything. Finally, in early December, Kwasniewski admitted that the concept proposed by the PSL was very much to the SLD's liking. Despite the fact that both parties agreed that the post of the voivode in a given voivodship would be offered to the party that won the elections in that voivodship, conflicts were not avoided. A heated dispute arose when the Wloclawek voivode was being replaced. In the Wloclawek voivodship, the SLD won the elections (it gained five seats, the PSL only one); however, it was a PSL member who was appointed as voivode. He received definite support from the regional self-government sejm. This issue is said to have been discussed at the meeting of the "directorate"; Ryszard Jarzembowski, who is in charge of coordinating the replacement of voivodes on behalf of the SLD, was forced to say that URM should have an SLD representative—in the rank of an under secretary of state—who would also exert influence on decisions concerning voivodes.

Between the Coalition and the Belweder

For quite a long time now, we have been witnessing a dispute over the posts of deputy ministers in the presidential ministries. As a result of the stance taken by the prime minister, who was afraid of a conflict with the Belweder, this controversy turned into a conflict between the Sejm National Defense Ministry, chaired by SdRP Secretary Jerzy Szmajdzinski, and the prime minister. Since December, the committee has been waiting for the prime minister to provide an answer to the question of merging posts by Jerzy Milewski. In the beginning, both PSL and SLD deputies demanded that the deputy ministerial posts in the presidential ministries be filled by their own people. When the prime minister did not really abandon this idea but definitely put off its implementation, the PSL stopped insisting on this. A few days ago, however, Leszek Bugaj (PSL) confirmed that the coalition would "not let it go at that," and, in a few weeks, it would have its own deputy minister in the National Defense Ministry. This demand emerged once again during the latest talks between Kwasniewski and Pawlak.

Principles of the Work of the Coalition

1. In line with the coalition agreement, responsibility for the right work of the coalition lies with the chairmen of the coalition groupings and chairmen of the Deputies' Clubs of these groupings, who act jointly.

2. The drafts of strategic political, economic, and cadre decisions of the government are submitted to the chairmen of the Deputies' Clubs of the coalition groupings before final decisions on them are made.

3. Decisions concerning the members of the leadership of all of the ministries, appointed by the coalition groupings, are made by the prime minister after consultations with the relevant deputy ministers and the chairmen of the coalition groupings whose representative does not head the given ministry.

4. Decisions concerning personnel issues in the voivodship state administration are preceded by consultations with the chairmen of the Deputies' Clubs of the coalition groupings.

[Box, p 2

Principles of the Work of the Coalition

The above-mentioned provisions were included in the appendix to the coalition agreement that was signed before the final composition of the Council of Ministers was forwarded to the Belweder.

Borowski Denies Responsibility for Breakup

LD0702183194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Should there be any breakup in the coalition, it will certainly not be over my part in the government but is far more likely to be over principles of cooperation, the application of which I had demanded in talks with the prime minister, and also perhaps over purely substantive matters, said Marek Borowski, deputy prime minister and finance minister, in an interview for the GLOS WIELKOLPOLSKI newspaper.

Borowski also insisted that, if the prime minister were not to accept his resignation, cooperation on the same conditions as had existed to date was impossible.

Pawlak on Borowski; Future of Coalition

LD0702213794 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1857 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Studio interview with Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by announcer Jaroslaw Gugala—live]

[Text] [Gugala] We welcome to the studio Mr. Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the Council of Ministers.

[Pawlak] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.

[Gugala] Prime minister, you have said that decisions about the situation in the coalition will depend on what your PSL [Polish Peasant Party] colleagues would say. Has any decision like this been made?

[Pawlak] This concerns not only PSL decisions but also issues connected with the future course of the economic policy and future transformations in our country, and I think that today's OPZZ [National Trade Union Alliance] proceedings show that these disputes and divisions occur not so much between the parties that make up the coalition but, rather, along various lines within the very parliamentary groups that make up the coalition. And this does not concern aspects of procedural matters; it concerns fundamental matters. It is a question of how Poland is going to be reformed from now on.

[Gugala] How is Poland going to be reformed from now on? Will you accept the resignation of Mr. Marek Borowski, the deputy prime minister and finance minister?

[Pawlak] Yes. I think that this decision by Mr. Borowski was made with his full attention, his full consideration and reflection, and that it how it should be treated. I think that, at the moment, this dispute concerns not so much procedural matters as an answer to the question of whether we are going to proceed in the direction of this straight forward liberal continuation, or, respecting the election results, we are going to fashion a prosocial policy, open to the needs of the economy and also the needs of the society.

And these are the questions asked by the people today because, when we meet the voters, we do not hear questions about procedure, about how the government proceeds. We hear questions about what solutions we are implementing, whether, for instance, we are changing policy principles, whether we are, for instance, going toward solutions that stimulate the economy or going toward solutions that shift benefits, social assistance, toward the poorest groups. This concerns, for instance, family benefits and housing benefits, and these are the kind of solutions that are needed now.

[Gugala] Prime minister, are you not afraid that this decision by you may bring about a very serious crisis inside the coalition, that it may make it so that it will be difficult to pursue any kind of policy whatsoever?

[Pawlak] I think the coalition is based on a jointly greed program, and here the decision of the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] Supreme Council also, first and foremost, points to the programmatic solutions, and I think this is what we are going to focus on. When we signed these coalition agreements, we were talking about the tasks facing us and the people's expectations and not about personalities, and that is how I want to continue to pursue this issue.

[Gugala] Is it possible to reconcile people's expectations with too short a blanket, which is what the state finances are? Marek Borowski, the deputy prime minister and finance minister, said that one could not conduct a policy separated from economic realities because it would not yield anything good for the people; on the contrary, it will cause greater inflation and trouble for the people.

[Pawlak] We are in agreement here. I think there is no controversy just here, but the question is whether we adopt a policy directed only toward simple fiscal mechanisms and simple mechanisms of distribution or take a direction toward searching for active forms regarding effects on the economy and active forms of receiving resources. Sometimes there were paradoxical situations, where the ministry responsible for revenues voiced doubts over ideas of different ministers aimed at revenue increases.

[Gugala] Are you of the opinion that the Finance Ministry failed in finding greater revenues?

[Pawlak] We are dealing here, first of all, with different approaches toward the creation of the budget. It cannot be a formula that we create a convenient budget, which could be implemented easily and which could be easily balanced, but that we create a budget that meets social

expectations and focuses on areas of particular importance from the viewpoint of the future. Here one can give some thought to whether all resources were used properly. The Sejm commissions, for example, draw attention to the need for modifications in the budget. We will discuss that tomorrow, and I think that many proposals by the commissions can be taken into account as they point to some sources for redistribution within the budget, for better use of resources, and they point to income sources, which can contribute to directing them toward indispensable and useful goals.

[Gugala] Does it mean that your government will present a new draft budget?

[Pawlak] I do not think so. We are responsible for this government proposal, and I think that not one single person is a guarantor of the budget. Times have changed. There were times in the past when personalities or parties guaranteed this or that political order. Now the majority of the public clearly supports democracy and a free market, so these guarantees are not so obvious and necessary here.

This budget is a government proposal, and, as the government, we are going to put forward the solutions that are active and that have received approval from the Sejm commissions.

I think that tomorrow, at the government meeting, we will be able to talk about the modifications that were discussed in the Sejm. Some of them will be accepted. There is also a fairly large batch of proposals that simply have no chance of being implemented because they have no basis in the present economic realities.

[Gugala] Quite recently, Deputy Prime Minister Marek Borowski was one of our guests, and he said that the budget proposed by the government was already a very optimistic budget, that there were many areas there where the amounts assumed as state budget revenues were in fact wishful thinking. Are you not afraid that it will simply not be possible to get greater budget revenues?

[Pawlak] I think that, just as we said, both in the election campaign and in the early months of the government, we have to focus on actions that strive toward universal collection of revenues, collection of taxes, collection of duties, and much attention has to be devoted here to effective operation of these mechanisms.

We need to pay much attention to the areas on which the collection of taxes depends—that is, that the whole structure of the treasury offices, the customs offices, is well equipped so that the officials who decide about state revenues have realistic possibilities for receiving the income, and then, in the future, we can also think about reducing the tax rates once they are universally paid.

I think it is important to concentrate these modest resources on actions of this kind; then we will have no problems as to whether these views are well grounded, whether this budget is realistic or highly optimistic. This budget is based on realities, and, according to our appraisals and our opinions, it is possible to implement it.

[Gugala] But are you not afraid, Prime Minister, that tomorrow you will in fact receive no opportunity to talk about the budget because you will simply have to talk about Marek Borowski?

[Pawlak] I think we agreed to form the coalition to implement economic programs, to improve the economic situation in Poland, and for this policy to have a human face and be directed both toward people who are working in factories and enterprises and toward all those who are jobless at the moment, and not through allowances and benefits but through creating jobs.

The policy should also be directed toward those who worked honestly and well and now live on old-age and disability pensions. We have been going in this direction, and the first results regarding old-age and disability pensions are visible.

There is still a lot to be done in social and health insurance. A serious question is how to effectively overcome unemployment and create jobs. This is a question of large infrastructure programs—for example, the highway construction program, the promotion of export, and....

[Gugala, interrupting] We could talk about this for a very long time. Prime Minister, do you assume that the coalition still exists, only without Mr. Marek Borowski?

[Pawlak] It is my conviction that the coalition still exists. While making decisions, every one of us should carefully consider the consequences of these decisions, and I think we have opportunities and possibilities to work for Poland in different places. I think that the effects of our work are of the utmost importance. If we are going to act like that, where we do it is secondary.

[Gugala] When are you going to meet Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski?

[Pawlak] We have arranged to hold a coalition meeting tomorrow [8 February], and I think we will discuss issues there, what has to be done and how, and not procedural matters.

[Gugala] Thank you for visiting our studio.

SdRP Denies Planned Candidate for Finance

LD0702232994 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2300 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Several SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] politicians holding high government offices met this evening at party headquarters. There will be no comment; it was an informal meeting of several SLD

[Democratic Left Alliance] ministers, the Social Democracy press spokesman, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, said after the meeting.

He also stated that the SLD would adopt a position on the prime minister's acceptance of Marek Borowski's resignation only after today's [8 February] meeting of the coalition.

The spokesman also denied a report by REUTERS that SdRP leader Aleksander Kwasniewski has a candidate for finance minister.

Walesa Not To Intervene in Dispute

LD0802101394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0800 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] President Lech Walesa is treating the Borowski-Pawlak dispute as an internal matter of the coalition and the government, Andrzej Zakrzewski, head of the president's political service team, has told RZECZPOSPOLITA. The president considers it inappropriate to adopt a position in the present situation. There also are not sufficient grounds for the president to break his holiday in the mountains, the spokesman said.

Prime Minister Accepts Borowski's Resignation

LD0802105394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1036 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 8 Feb—Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak has accepted the resignation of Marek Borowski, deputy prime minister and finance minister. The head of the government informed journalists of his decision this morning before a meeting of the government. Marek Borowski is taking part in the government meeting.

Aleksander Luczak on PSL, Rural Policy

WS0702144594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5-6 Feb 94 p 11

[Interview with Polish Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak, deputy chairman of the Polish Peasant Party Chief Council, by Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Kazimierz Groblewski; place and date not given: "How Did It Happen? One Cannot Negate Everything"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Luczak] The Democratic Union, which is beyond a doubt the strongest party derived from Solidarity roots, keeps suffering defeats. The Solidarity camp failed to establish a party that would be a driving force for the transformations. Practically speaking, it is hard to tell what the social basis of Solidarity is now supposed to be. You keep asking: "How did you manage to score the [election] success?" I think the answer lies in the clarity of the social groups that both parties addressed: The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] addressed urban residents, mainly laborers, whereas we addressed residents of rural areas, mainly farmers.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] But Solidarity parties also addressed the same social group.

[Luczak] But Solidarity units kind of went against all that, and, in this way, they wasted their victory of 1989.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Don't think that what happened on 19 September was simply a matter of society displaying an opposite reaction?

[Luczak] It is possible. We [the Polish Peasant Party (PSL)] and they [the SLD] are both at the stage of adapting ourselves to democracy. Before the elections, society supported the previous system very vigorously, but now, after four years have passed, society made a decision that now is the time for us. Those who are in power are always more vulnerable to criticism.

But I would oppose it when someone says that our parties are postcommunist. Genealogy is what it is; everyone was born at some point. Take a look at the origins of some Solidarity activists. [passage omitted]

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] But isn't it so that the main reason for the PSL's success [in the 19 September 1993 elections] was that the party guaranteed to maintain the status quo in rural areas and the areas' structure, that the PSL gave hope that nothing would change and that what was going on for four years will be slowed down, if not completely withdrawn?

[Luczak] My view is that, as is the case with many other areas, agricultural changes must be evolutionary. Any type of action aimed at gaining a fast result is doomed to failure. Throughout the 1970's and the 1980's, the authorities were afraid of farmers. They were afraid to interfere with farmers' property so they maintained the status quo.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] So you [PSL activists] decided to echo the authorities by saying: Let the rural areas remain the way they are.

[Luczak] Belarusians or Ukrainians would give a lot in return for being able to have the kind of rural areas we have. We, on the other hand, have them but are not happy anyway. Unless appropriate means are directed to rural areas, nothing will come of policies written down on paper. Even if those means are indeed directed there, I am terribly skeptical as far as agricultural reforms are concerned. I can see that the civilized world is helpless when faced with agricultural problems.

[Excerpts] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] So, in your view, problems in rural areas are unsolvable?

[Luczak] They can be solved, but that is very hard to do because, with current technologies, one can lead to the kind of growth of agricultural output that is almost without limits. That, of course, causes rules of employment to change. There is also a clash with routine ways of behavior, with attachment to land, and with tradition.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You promised before the [19 September] elections that you would find such appropriate financial means for rural areas, as well as subsidies and inexpensive credits. But now it turns out that there is not enough money in the budget; even your own Sejm deputies club is critical of that.

[Luczak] There is more money in the budget than was the case last year, but there is still not enough for everyone. Those who think that one can achieve progress in that area in a very short time are wrong. The purpose of our election program was to convince people, and my view is that it was done well. But another issue is that the program's implementation must be spread out over time.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Is it your view that the fall in popularity rating for the United Peasant Party-PSL in the period preceding the 1989 and 1991 elections was just temporary, or is it perhaps the case that the PSL's current success is just temporary? What is permanent?

[Luczak] Nothing in this world is permanent. We are all just a passing phase.... Not to waste the great victory—that is what wise behavior should be about, in this situation.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] All right, but we will have self-governmental elections shortly.

[Luczak] Let it all boil there, in that melting pot. Then it will turn out that some people are destined to be in office two years, whereas other people four years. We have a democracy now, and there is nothing permanent in a democracy.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] So you can imagine the PSL not being permanent?

[Luczak] As a peasant movement, we have a hundred years behind us, and I would not like to live long enough to see the movement's end. I will always keep saying that the peasant movement has achieved the most now, when you take a look at its entire history. I think it is likely that, in the future, we may be in the opposition, that we will be a party without successes. But that possibility is a feature of democracy. The peasant movement may go through a worse period of its history, but the most important thing is that it be on the list of those parties that will be permanently participating in the country's political life over the next two decades.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Can you imagine a situation where a completely different party would gain the votes of your electorate, whereas you would disappear from the scene and become a very small, a miniature kind of party?

[Luczak] It is possible theoretically, but I think we have enough common sense in what we do to not let that happen.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You are a class party, the last of your kind. Will such parties continue to exist much longer?

[Luczak] There is a whole debate going on about whether we are a class party or an all-nation one. An all-nation party was being built beginning in the early 1940's, from the days of Mikolajczyk. But the fact that it is so hard for us to detach ourselves from the class nature is a consequence of tradition and of various interdependencies linked to it. We are a young society, genealogically speaking. The first generations made up of laborers and intelligentsia are always very negatively predisposed toward their rural origins. We gained big support in rural areas; that group of people was convinced by what we told them. But I think that, in terms of a party program, we are not a class party but one whose program is for all social groups.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Will the PSL "guarantee everyone profitability of agricultural production through the selling of their products?" You know where that quote is from—your campaign leaflet.

[Luczak] There is nothing you can guarantee forever in a market economy. Every artificial creation will prove impossible to implement after some time passes. But it would also be a bad thing if one were to discontinue measures aimed at guaranteeing the profitability of production. Everyone wants to receive the kind of payment for his work that would compensate for the labor he invested. If you have a peasant investing more in his production than what he receives after selling the product (I am ignoring here his own labor for the moment), that is morally repugnant and economically unacceptable, and, in that case, perhaps one should guarantee the profitability of agricultural production through administrative measures.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] That would be a complete return to the old ways.

[Luczak] No one will do it generally and as a wide-sweeping measure. But to promote agricultural production and to preserve certain types of crops, one must create the right conditions to make profitability clearly visible. But we will not go back to quotas or uniform prices throughout the country.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Does a politician feel ashamed at any time? I mean the kind of shame when he promises something during an election campaign but later, when his party is in power and he has the means to implement it, he fails to do what he promised. I am saying that because you sound as if you assumed from the very beginning that what you had talked about will not be implemented.

[Luczak] You cannot approach politics in a way that is detached from reality, nor can you, I would say, approach politics in moral terms only. Politics has its own rules. One knows from the very beginning that

nothing contained in an election program can be implemented right away. Such is the case the world over.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Are you saying one should not believe politicians?

[Luczak] Politics is an art of talking to society. There definitely should be a certain margin of confidence, but not "from wall to wall." There must be a certain margin, there must be something that binds society together, something that will make it...

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] ...Decide that the thing is lost?

[Luczak] Well, yes. Such are the rules of the game.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Your government implements to a large extent the program of the previous cabinets.

[Luczak] It is a very good thing that there are no major turning points; society would not stand for that.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] But, in that case, don't you think there is room on the political scene for the kind of PSL the people think it is or for the kind they voted for? While in power now, the PSL is doing something different from what it promised.

[Luczak] How many times did we have radicals, socialists, or Christian-democratic activists in power—I am talking about other countries now—and then it seemed it was the end, but they gained power again. There is something in nations, in society, something...

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] ...Irrational?

[Luczak] No, I mean more like expecting a change. Once the new governing team brings disappointment, nostalgia for the past is born. It was better in the old days....

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] ...And we were younger then?

[Luczak] Exactly. So people say: Let us go back to that now; let us not vote for those who are in power now.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] So that means party programs have nothing to do with choices, but, instead, there are simply some stages? A party leaves and another comes along. So, in your view, party programs are completely meaningless?

[Luczak] You keep trying to make me say that election promises are just black and white. That is not true. In my view, when something is black only or white only, that is a very bad thing because it gives rise to extremes—for instance, communism or fascism. Poland has entered the kind of phase where parliamentary coalitions will be establishing cabinets, and, after gaining power, these coalitions will mark their identity on the political scene not by making something black and white but by approaching social needs and privatization needs in a different manner. And once social moods take a swing in the other direction, there will be different priorities visible. Politics cannot be black and white. Countries that want to be stable and play even a small role must counteract extremes to enable them to keep moving down the same road but in a slightly different groove. We may see that happen in Poland.

When it comes to election campaigns, they are based on their own rules. During an election campaign, you must present programs, you must speak through slogans because you are talking to people who often see a politician for the first time. These people would be bored if you tried to detail the program item by item. So you must use simple words like "here," "now," "we," "nobody again," "never." But the people must understand that, if a particular coalition is back in power, particular issues will be focused on more.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What role did the church play in the PSL's success in the most recent elections? Do you think the church has reached the stage of regarding the PSL as "its own" party?

[Luczak] The church did not involve itself unequivocally on either our side or anyone else's. I would regard it as a sign that the church refuses to involve itself politically. The church's neutral position during the election campaign—not telling people who to vote for—objectively helped us.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] I am wondering whether the ability to create the view among people that the PSL is both a left-wing party and a Catholic one is not a prescription for your next success.

[Luczak] That is a special trait displayed by parties active in rural areas. We are a party that, from the very beginning of its activity, has always wanted to have good rapport with the church, in terms of both religion and the philosophy of life. But, beginning with Witos, the PSL did not want to have the church as its patron. Peasants wanted to decide on their own which direction their policies should take. True, there were cases of priests who wanted to be in command of the peasant movement, but these measures ended in failure. Generally speaking, the peasant movement was with God, but it refused to act with the church as its patron.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] A politician said that we will have a PSL-Belvedere coalition in power by year's end.

[Luczak] No, no.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] We will probably know the names of presidential candidates at the end of the year. Will that be a cause for disagreement with the SLD. In other words, will you come up with your own candidate?

[Luczak] I cannot imagine the PSL running in the presidential elections in the coalition. The PSL will come up with its own candidate.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Who will that be?

[Luczak] [No response published]

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Will your candidate compete with the SLD's?

[Luczak] The governing coalition is one thing, but presidential elections are quite another. Despite the complexity of the issue, presidential campaigns are always very personalized.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] The previous presidential elections extracted a heavy toll on the Solidarity camp. Will these coming ones have a destructive effect on the coalition?

[Luczak] At that time, the starting point was different—the Solidarity camp constituted a whole that all of a sudden cracked during the election campaign. Despite the coalition nature of our government, I think we do not constitute a whole, either in terms of ideology or party programs. The governing coalition was set up for a defined period of time, with the goal of implementing the tasks defined in the coalition agreement.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Don't you dream of a demonstration on Aleje Ujazdowskie under the banner "Out with Luczak, out with [Prime Minister] Pawlak, out with the PSL and [chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers] Strak"?

[Luczak] I have a view on this that boils down to this: When you dream of something, it will not come true. So may I have only such dreams and not other kinds.

Agriculture Group Demands Government Talks

LD0802115194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1000 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Text] The national protest committee for the defense of Polish agriculture has asked the highest authorities of Poland to start talks urgently. Andrzej Lepper, the leader of the Samoobrona [militant farmers organization], suggested a state farm at Montowo in Torun Province as the venue for talks.

The committee demands, among other things, the increase of funds for agriculture by 8 trillion zlotys by raising the budget deficit, and that priority be given to workers' companies in leasing former state farms. It also demands cheap credits for the purchase of turnover assets and for running production, and that those guilty of destroying Polish agriculture be called to account.

Minister Objects to Senator's Accusations

AU0802105194 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 3 Feb p 10

[Radu Tudor article: "The Minister of National Defense Believes That He Has Tolerated Long Enough the Greater Romania Party Senator"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu, Romanian minister of national defense, has been for two months the target of certain preposterous attacks of the Greater Romania Party [PRM] Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor. In the pages of the weeklies ROMANIA MARE and POLITICA, the defense minister together with other officers of the Romanian Army, are described and called names in the most aberrant possible manner.

The PRM senator's saraband of curses and slander has a very banal cause: Every available means must be taken to promote his brother, that is, Colonel Marcu Tudor, to the rank of general because that is what Corneliu Vadim Tudor wants.

General Niculae Spiroiu considers the request of the PMR senator as aberrant. Because he dared to defy Vadim, the minister of defense became the mocking subject of the ROMANIA MARE and POLITICA magazines.

After a letter addressed to Oliviu Gherman, the president of the Senate, in which he requests that Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor's behavior should be discussed by the Commission of Discipline and Immunity of the Senate, Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu is back again.

Yesterday, on 2 February, he addressed an open letter to the presidents of the two chambers of the parliament, in which he broadly discusses the scandalous situation in which the Romanian Army and its minister are placed. Niculae Spiroiu requested that the Commissions in change of defense, public order, and national security should be convened in a meeting and thus, he should be given the opportunity to explain the aberrant situation and the very serious accusations of the PRM senator. Until now, presidents Adrian Nastase and Oliviu Gherman have had a more than tolerant attitude toward Vadim Tudor's abnormal attacks directed against the Romanian Army.

Protest Letter Published

AU0802104994 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 3 Feb 94 p 10

["Letter sent by Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu, Minister of National Defense of Romania, to the presidents of the legal bodies of the Romanian Parliament—Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu Calls for a Meeting of the Commissions in Charge of Defense, Public Order, and National Security of the Parliament To Discuss C.V. Tudor's Slander"]

[Text] Messrs. Presidents, I feel most uncomfortable that I have to draw your attention again to a fact that is absolutely unqualifiable, but, given its profound implications on the stability, functioning, and cohesion of the military institution of our country, I am compelled to choose this way of notifying you of it and finding a potential solution to this embarrassing conflict.

As you know, for more than two months, I have become the target of malicious attacks, expressed in an uncivilized language. As you most probably have realized, I am talking about the press campaign launched by Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor [Greater Romania Party president], in two publications that he is sponsoring, the ROMANIA MARE [Greater Romania] and the POLITICA.

The goal of these actions is obviously to distort the image made about my person and to destroy the public credibility of the minister of national defense. For this goal the entire arsenal of disinformation technology has been made use of, starting with lies and misinterpretations, and ending with hilarious denigratory associations of ideas. In fact, it is no secret that this was the major weapon that the sponsor of the two publications—who nowadays is not embarrassed to sign his works with the title of SENATOR OF BUCHAREST [preceding three words in capitals]—used relentlessly for his own political ascent.

As far as I am concerned, as a constant supporter of the idea of the political equidistance of the army, I should be completely indifferent to the way in which he chooses to build his own career. However, I cannot remain indifferent when these perfidious attacks are directed against the person of the minister of national defense because the implications are much more serious. These types of actions are aimed at destroying the element of TRUST IN OUR LEADERS, which is vital for the military institution.

Therefore, Messrs. Presidents, I feel compelled to ask you to agree and be kind enough to convene the meeting of the Commissions in charge of defense, public order, and national security of the two chambers of the parliament, because I wish to present these commissions with the necessary explanations for the insinuations and slander directed against me.

I am requesting this because the core of the problem is the fact that, respecting the provisions of the country's laws and the military rules, I am "guilty" of not having satisfied an absolutely unjustified claim or pressure of the senator; however, such an act would have meant a serious violation of certain rules stipulated in the Statute of Military Cadres and the procedure of granting promotions to certain functions and ranks in the Army.

With all the explanations I gave to Mr. Corneliu Vadim Tudor, in his capacity as senator—although for two months I have kept confidential that personal request, in order to avoid a public scandal—he continued the attack against my person, the goal of his actions being to

discredit me and to destroy the image that our society, and not only that, has made about me ever since I became the head of the Ministry of National Defense.

Taking into consideration that one of the first denigratory articles that was published after 1 January 1994, was signed as Senator of Bucharest, I addressed to the president of the Senate an open letter requesting that the Legal Commission in charge of appointments, discipline, immunity, and validations should be notified about the attitude of Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor.

Given all the aforementioned considerations, including those regarding the importance of the position of the ministry whose head I am, I express my hope and my complete confidence that my request will be adequately dealt with.

As far as my person is concerned, I am at the disposal of the commissions at any time their meeting is convened. I must also mention that I also informed the president of Romania, the Romanian Government, and the Supreme Military Council of the Army about Vadim Tudor's actions.

Messrs. Presidents, please accept my profound respect for the constitutional institutions over which you preside and for you personally.

Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu, Minister of National Defense

Former Interior Minister Released for Treatment

AU0702183394 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 4 Feb 94 p 1

["N.M."- signed report: "Tudor Postelnicu Released From Jail for Six Months"]

[Text] Tudor Postelnicu, 63, former interior minister in the government headed by Constantin Dascalescu [during the Ceausescu regime], has been released from jail for six months in order to receive medical treatment. Postelnicu left the Jilava penitentiary yesterday. He is suffering from several urological and cardiovascular ailments. Just one day before Postelnicu left the penitentiary, his wife underwent surgery following an accident in which she fractured her thighbone. If we are not mistaken, the only remaining member of the CPEx [Executive Political Committee of the former Romanian Communist Party] in jail at Jilava after the release of Postelnicu would be Ion Dinca [former first deputy prime minister].

Civic Alliance Warns About Media Control

AU0702183594 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 3 Feb 94 p 3

[Statement by the Civic Alliance; place and date not given: "Recent Amendments"]

[Text] The Civic Alliance and the Association for Free and Correct Information via Radio and Television draw attention to the executive power's attempt to legally place the public audiovisual media under its jurisdiction.

The introduction, at the last moment, of a set of amendments by the parliamentary group of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], after the draft bill had been worked on for a long time by the specialized commission of the Chamber of Deputies, testifies to an attempt to either delay the legislation process or (if the amendments would be accepted by the plenary session of the Chamber of Deputies) to the desire to totally and effectively acquire these two public services—radio and television.

Not only because of certain provisions that limit the independence of the radio and television and their staff but also through procedures proposed for the appointment of the Consultative Council, the Management Boards and their chairmen (by the government and the presidency respectively), the PDSR amendments violate the principles stipulated by any democratic audio-visual law, including the recommendations made to our country by the Council of Europe.

Bucharest, 2 February 1994

Democratic Party Agrees to Talks With PDSR

AU0702163494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] In connection with the proposal of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] to conduct a dialogue with the opposition parties, the Executive Bureau of the Democratic Party [PD(FSN)] reiterates its readiness to participate in a dialogue—a communique received from the PD(FSN) reads. In the first stage of the discussions, the PD(FSN) will be represented at the talks by the Internal Political Relations Department.

Another communique of the same political grouping refers to the statements made on 5 February by Mr. Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova, and Mr. Dimitru Motpan, leader of the Agrarian Democratic Party [PDAM] of the Republic of Moldova. The PD(FSN) Executive Bureau considers that they are uncultured allegations with an electoral tinge, running counter to the historic truth and to the interests of the Romanians living between the Prut and Dniester Rivers. Regarding the proposal that the parties advocating the unification with Romania should be excluded from the political life, the PD(FSN) considers it as an antidemocratic gesture, at variance with the course toward democracy and pluralism assumed by the Chisinau authorities before their own people and the European democratic institutions. The PD(FSN), the communique points out, is deeply involved and committed to achieving closer ties between Romania and the Republic of Moldova.

Rose Says Serbs Responsible for Attack

AU0502172294 Paris AFP in English 1646 GMT 5 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, Feb 5 (AFP)—A shell fired on Sarajevo's main market place killed at least 58 people, many of them elderly shoppers, and injured 140 others on Saturday, hospital and mortuary staff said. [passage omitted]

Two UN peacekeepers—a Frenchman and a Canadian—drove to the site in a jeep and offered to help, but were jostled by an angry crowd and forced to leave, a French photographer at the scene said. But other peacekeepers took seven of the wounded to the UN hospital in an armoured troop transport vehicle.

The attack came a day after mortar shells killed eight civilians, including two girls aged eight and nine, in the suburb of Dobrinja as they were queueing for food aid.

The new British commander of UN forces in Bosnia, Lieutenant General Michael Rose, said Saturday an investigation had shown "with certainty" that Bosnian Serbs were responsible for Friday's attack. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serb military commander General Manojlo Milanovic protested to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) about "accusations from the Moslem authorities that the Serb army had committed the massacre" on Friday, the Bosian Serb news agency SNRA reported.

Milanovic threatened to block relief convoys travelling across Serb-held territory from Monday unless a joint commission was set up by Sunday morning, including Serb, Moslem and UN experts, to investigate Saturday's massacre.

Bosnian Vice-President Ejup Ganic meanwhile blamed the Serbs and called for "an end to the arms embargo (against Bosnian authorities) so they can defend themselves." [passage omitted]

Izetbegovic Accuses West of 'Moral Weakness'

TA0802100494 Ankara Show Television in Turkish 2040 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Telephone interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic in Sarajevo by Mehmet Ali Birand in the studio; from the "32d Day" program—live, in English with simultaneous translation into Turkish; transcribed from the English]

[Text] [Birand] Mr. President, I would like to express the heartfelt sympathy of the Turkish public. We share your horror and your sorrow. Would you now please tell me what is the actual situation in Sarajevo? Is the bombing still going on?

[Izetbegovic] The bombing continues, but with less intensity than before. But the Serbian snipers from the neighboring fields are very active today. They roam the streets, and it is very dangerous.

[Birand] Now, sir, do you feel that this time the West will really move and take military action?

[Izetbegovic] Just an initiative by Butrus Butrus-Ghali, as you know, maybe, and today from the European Union also. In my opinion, a military action is probable. If I have to assess the possibility, I could say that it is 50-50.

[Birand] You are not 100-percent sure. It is still 50-50?

[Izetbegovic] Yes.

[Birand] Do you believe that the bombing of the surrounding hills of Sarajevo will deter the Serbs, or do you think that only a very strong military action with ground forces will stop the Serbs?

[Izetbegovic] In my opinion, an air strike, an action from the air, would be enough, would be sufficient. We do not expect any ground operation. This ground operation is not necessary, because we have enough of our boys to fight.

[Birand] I see. How much longer can you hold if the West does not take any military action and restricts its power to just lip service?

[Izetbegovic] Now it is a matter of survival. We will never surrender. We cannot surrender. It is a question of to be or not to be, to live or to die. We will never surrender, and the Serbs can never enter Sarajevo.

[Birand] Mr. President, why is the West not moving? Do you have an explanation?

[Izetbegovic] What can you say? The West is at the same time rich and poor. It is at the same time strong and weak. It is a matter of moral weakness in the Western world. They are not ready to fight.

[Birand] Mr. President, now you are speaking directly to millions of Turkish citizens. Now tell us what we can do to help you.

[Izetbegovic] I am very happy to greet your listeners and the Turkish people. I would like to convey my cordial greetings to your listeners. I would like to first congratulate the coming Ramadan and to thank for all your support and help. We have many friends and brothers in the world, all over the world. We know that you are our brothers and our friends. Thank you for all that. We do not feel alone in the world. Thank you.

[Birand] Mr. President, thank you very much indeed.

[Izetbegovic] Thank you.

Expects Serbs To 'Test Europe'

LD0702230294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] [Announcer] Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, gave a statement to Sarajevo Radio and TV reporters following [UN Secretary General Butrus] Butrus-Ghali's request to NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner on the authorization of air attacks against the Serb aggressor's positions.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] I believe that this is a request to prepare for such an action, to authorize the command of NATO's Sector South to carry out the attacks, but—and this is important—at the UN request. This means that Butrus-Ghali will have to order it once again. This is typical of Butrus-Ghali's manner.

But, I hear that this is obviously being seriously discussed. It is becoming a serious issue. As you know, we held talks with [UN envoy] Akashi yesterday. He then held talks with the Serb side. We demanded—to avoid the air attacks but achieve the goal at the same time—that the Serbs, of their own free will, withdraw their artillery and place it under UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] control. This was our latest demand. They issued some counterproposal or other—for the artillery to be just monitored—that we obviously rejected.

We increased the pressure today by sending another letter to the [European] Twelve, who have just begun a session, and to the NATO secretary general—they are holding a session tomorrow.

Something seems to be moving in the European Union. I heard that the European Union has made a decision to break the siege of the city, if necessary with the use of force. So, obviously, things are moving in some direction. There is at least a 50-50 chance that NATO attacks against those positions will materialize.

I believe that the Serbs will take the risk. They will try to test Europe, to see if it will do it or not, for their experience with Europe so far has shown that Europe is indecisive. I think they will play that card. I would not say that they will withdraw of their own [free] will. Something has changed, but we have paid for it. The price was those 70 lives and 200 wounded, for people to realize that such absurdity and evil cannot be tolerated any more. Or they understood that this is not only the question of Bosnia- Herzegovina, that this is—as our esteemed visitor from Pakistan [Benazir Bhutto] said—that this is a moral issue, which concerns every man. Can crime be tolerated and is it not encouragement for crime and fascism, opening the doors wide for them in the world? You see, there are some new, sad phenomena in Russia, which really pose a threat to the world, to the survival of the world. If we look back perhaps we could trace it to the lax attitude and tolerance in Europe toward an evil that appeared in the Balkans some four or five years ago. [end recording]

Writes to Papoulias, Woerner

AU0702211494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency has sent a letter to EC Chairman Karolos Papoulias and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.

Esteemed gentlemen, in my letter of 5 February, I informed you about the massacre of civilians that took place that day at the Sarajevo market. Unfortunately, the statement by the responsible officials in the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] indicates that the revulsion felt by the world and the readiness for action will again be amortized by a prolonged investigation as to the origin of the shell [words indistinct], offers for yet another futile cease-fire, and statements about the necessity of establishing peace acceptable to both sides, and so on.

I am afraid that the debate will focus on one shell, and thus divert the world's attention from the more than 300,000 shells that have been fired on this city during the 22 months of the siege. It is not true that over 400 artillery pieces on the hills around Sarajevo are to serve as the Serb defense against the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. There are there for blackmail purposes and to inflict suffering on the civilian population, to halt the life in the city, and to force us into making unacceptable concessions to the aggressor.

Of the 9,872 people killed in the shelling of the city, only 164 have been soldiers. Some 1,563 children have been killed and 278 pregnant women. Some 57,897 civilians have been wounded, and over 19,000 of those are maimed for live. Approximately 10,000 apartments and 30,000 places of work have been destroyed or damaged. The city maternity hospital was set ablaze with precise and persistent fire, as were the National Library, the Institute for Oriental Studies, the depot and all the tramways and city buses. The city hospital has been hit 267 times, and nine doctors and 16 patients have been killed. All the churches, mosques, and synagogues in the city have suffered hits and damage. All the Olympic sports facilities have been destroyed, as have the Assembly and government buildings. There is not a single building, school, or university building in the city that has not been hit. Schooling is being conducted in improvised schoolrooms. All the hotels have been destroyed, and the Holiday Inn is the only one open, even though it has been damaged. The UN Protection Force building is a frequent target for artillery attacks.

Gentlemen, this city has been in hell for over 700 days. It is time the Serb machine for killing people and destroying shrines, schools, and hospitals is stopped and removed. I appeal to you to inform the members of your organizations of the contents of this letter.

This is said in the letter that President Alija Izetbegovic sent to Karolos Papoulias and Manfred Woerner.

Izetbegovic Tells Assembly Talks Face Collapse

AU0702205694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] As we said at the beginning of the newscast, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly is currently meeting in Sarajevo behind closed doors. President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency opened the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly session with the following words:

Esteemed deputies, guests, and friends: I have a somewhat unpleasant duty to address you again on the issue of the Geneva negotiations, which have become [word indistinct] at which Bosnia meets its friends but also its enemies, both open ones and those concealed. The negotiations have become deadlocked and they are facing a collapse. That is why we are meeting today to exchange views and decide what to do. Perhaps some new ideas will be expressed in this hall today, which will point to a way out of this standstill and open up some new paths.

I therefore call on the deputies—since they are the most informed and called upon as to what the people think—to tell us their views and present new ideas that might encourage the negotiations. Let them do so bravely and freely, as this is a time of change and everything is (open) to suspicion and reassessment—everything, that is, except some basic principles and the one aim, and that is the salvation of the people and the country. There are no taboos and nothing is politically sacred.

During the previous Geneva negotiations, our delegation consistently represented the views of the Assembly, as established at the session on 28 September 1993. We asked the Serb side to return the occupied territories in the Drina River valley and in western Bosnia. The Serbs made some concessions in eastern Bosnia, but they also took two steps back when it came to Brcko and Doboj.

The Croatian side persistently refused to accept the mutually satisfactory solution regarding our access to the sea at Neum. They offered solutions unacceptable to us near Prevlaka and in Peljesac. The Croats also rejected our proposal for a military disengagement in central Bosnia. We proposed that the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] forces pulled out from the region of Vitez and Novi Travnik, in which case the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units would also withdraw, and the civilian bodies and the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] members would take control. Since they rejected this proposal, the confrontation near Vitez has continued.

The talks are to continue on 10 February. They are entering a critical phase. We expect a more active participation by the United States, which can only have a positive influence on the course of the negotiations. I believe that our delegation should be given full freedom to negotiate, but the Assembly would make the final decision. The delegation should represent the views of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Assembly of 28 September 1993, but also take into account all the useful ideas and proposals that will be presented today by the deputies or the deputies' caucus. The delegation should also be authorized—if no progress is made, and if it judges that the negotiations on this basis have become exhausted—to request that the entire issue be referred to the UN Security Council. In that case, we would ask the Council to implement finally all the relevant resolutions on Bosnia-Herzegovina—that is, we would remind the Council of its duty. I can see no other solution.

I do not think there is need to stress that our position at the negotiations depends to a large extent on our military situation, the strength or the weakness of the enemy, the morale and the limits of endurance of our people, the humanitarian conditions, and other elements. The state delegation has tried to be as objectively informed about these facts as possible, and it has tried within its limits to assess as realistically as possible these important factors.

Finally I would like to reiterate that our aim is peace but only just peace. All our efforts are devoted to this end, President Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency said today in his opening address at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly session.

Prime Minister Silajdzic Addresses Assembly

AU0802103294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1843 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Address by Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in Sarajevo on 7 February—live]

[Text] The assessment of the (five-month-long) activities of a government, its abilities and the correctness of its policies, would be a normal and routine democratic procedure in conditions of peace. However, in times of war, particularly in such times as face our country and people, this way of doing it is not common in democratic practice. This assembly is sitting in session, and this government is submitting a report on the first 100 days of work only about 300 to 400 meters from the front line, and this in a city in which over the last few days alone about 100 civilians have been killed and 200 wounded.

Under these conditions, 100 days to the people exposed to the horrors of war is a long time, while to the government of the country facing tremendous problems, it is a short time. There is a constant race with time.

Esteemed deputies, I would like to remind you that the new government took up duty under extremely hard conditions, characterized by a further escalation of the aggression with the open military engagement not only of Serbia and Montenegro, but also the Republic of Croatia; the catastrophic humanitarian situation, caused by the blockade imposed by both aggressors and the indecisiveness of the international community to eliminate that blockade; the deadlock of the peace process that is on the one hand the result of the aggressor's commitment to the war option, and on the other, the

result of the lack of political will of the most important international protagonists to achieve the principles they set themselves in resolutions and other documents, and the devastated economic and financial system, the destroyed and badly damaged vital production capacities and the fractured economic ties between various parts of the country. This difficult situation has been further worsened by the problems created through the long- lasting obstruction by certain members of the previous government. This resulted in confusion and an interruption in the work of some ministries and certain segments of the government in general, and further caused the suspension of work of some significant state institutions at a time when their work was most needed.

Apart from that, there was the attempt at a separatist putsch in the Bihac region, and when the putsch was thwarted, the separatists stepped into open collaboration with the aggressor. One should certainly say that the formation of the new government was spearheaded by the consolidation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, whose new configuration stood unified behind the concept of preserving the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and—on that basis—behind seeking political solutions in the peace process, while decisively resisting the aggression and strengthening the army and all the defense potential.

The formation of the new government was the result of such commitments, which opened the road to the creation of a qualitatively new atmosphere in the entire state structure. Under these conditions the government—although according to the Constitution it is responsible for the situation in all spheres of life— had to determine the priority tasks and aims, and for that reason it directed its activities in the following direction: Providing the most urgently needed means and conditions for the survival of the population during the winter period; strengthening the overall defense capacities of the country, with the stress on strengthening and developing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army as the key factor of defense; undertaking measures for alleviating the very hard position of the refugees and the displaced people, and creating the climate for their return; adapting the economic and financial system to a war economy footing in order to place all the resources in the defense of the country and the survival of the population, and consolidating the state management and judiciary, and the advancement of justice in general, and particularly the personal and property security of all the citizens, and the protection of human rights, which is particularly important in times of war. Since the establishment of peace is the main, and within this government's program, the ultimate aim, the government has been intensely engaged in the efforts to get the peace process out of the impasse and steer it in the directions that offer the chance to establish a just and stable peace.

According to everything, the Geneva talks—which imposed the wrong concept from the start—are facing definite collapse as both the aggressors are using them as a smokescreen, while their real aim is to conquer and annex through war most of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory. I do not intend to elaborate here on the reasons for the failure of the peace process so far and the consequences of that failure, just as I will not elaborate on the concept of the peace initiative to be launched by our country since that is the issue to be addressed at a special point on the agenda of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly session.

Nevertheless, I would like to say that the government, within its sphere of competence, has invested enormous efforts to avoid the collapse of the peace process. Our diplomacy has been working very intensively in this direction. It sought and obtained political support and specific help from friendly countries. It insisted in the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and other relevant international organizations and institutions to carry out the principles that the international community has set itself. It spread the truth about Bosnia-Herzegovina, it mobilized the world public to act by applying pressure against the inertia and hypocrisy of the political establishments of their countries.

At the same time, we thoroughly analyzed possible solutions and intensively sought ways of accepting all options that are offering at least the minimum of justice and prospects for stable peace. However, at no time have we ever considered accepting capitulation. It appears that this is what is being asked of us.

We are deeply aware that with this kind of attitude by certain members of the international community we have as many chances of achieving peace as our army and our people demonstrate strength, decisiveness, and success in the struggle for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although sincerely committed to peace, we had to invest the maximum of effort to further develop and strengthen our defense capabilities.

Within its sphere of responsibility, the government has taken specific measures concerning the creation of a unified system of financing defense and providing logistical support, because the unintegrated systems in some communes or districts have not only been ineffective but also suited the unacceptable concepts of waging a defense war inside the country and within local communities, while neglecting the global interests of the country.

Within the development of the global concept for securing funds for the needs of the defense, at the proposal of the government we adopted a decision on a tax for defense and rebuilding of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This tax is expected to produce significant results, especially in regard to the material contributions by our workers employed abroad.

The characteristic of this war is that the aggressors have been attacking civilian targets with all their might, and that the mass killing of civilians has become an integral part of the aggressors' strategy. Despite the fact that we have been taking certain measures for the protection of

the civilian population, it is obvious that this is becoming a task of the greatest importance. In this respect the government has already set directives for the work of the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Civil Defense, and other institutions of the system.

We have achieved significant results in the development of our defense forces. We certainly do not want to create illusions that we are equal to the aggressor in regard to military equipment. On the contrary, the unjust embargo has considerably impaired our defense capabilities. However, regarding manpower, the organization of the system of command, a high combat morale, and the mobilization of all potentials on which the defense depends, we created not only a respectable army but also an increasingly sound system of defense as a whole. This is of crucial importance for further course of the war and the further course and outcome of the peace process, because we take the view, we are sure that a solution can no longer be imposed on us with the aggressors' military means. The international community is becoming aware of this, and so is the aggressor himself. This means that in the future the peace process must embark on the path of finding a formula for a genuine peace, and not capitulation.

Regarding the provision of conditions and means for the survival of the population in the winter period, I must say that the results achieved so far are not proportionate to the enormous efforts invested by the government in this respect. The activities of the government on securing funds for the survival of the population were primarily directed at the issues concerning the delivery of humanitarian aid, the mobilization of natural resources and available facilities for the production and distribution of food, and finding energy resources.

Through its relevant ministries the government has also undertaken measures needed to implement the plan for spring sowing in 1994 and to activate facilities for the quick production of food. The key causes of the critical humanitarian situation lie in the fact that the aggressor is using the humanitarian situation to achieve his war aims, which cannot be achieved on the battlefields. At the same time, some protagonists in international politics are using the grave humanitarian situation as a means of applying pressure on the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to accept solutions that suit certain powers in this region. We told the international community this openly at our extraordinary session.

The (?lack) of resolve by the international community to carry out the resolutions on the military protection of the convoys and ensure the safety of relief routes, and the reluctance on the part of UNPROFOR to carry out at least the measures that it was empowered to do by the otherwise inadequate mandate, I repeat the inadequate mandate, have contributed toward the amount of humanitarian aid that has been delivered being well below the existential minimum.

For these reasons, the government held an extraordinary session from which it sent a message to relevant international institutions and the entire world public to prevent a human catastrophe. This call has met with a positive response and the first results can already be felt.

After this objective criticism, one should say that we appreciate the efforts made by UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and other humanitarian organizations in practice. We are aware that without them, with their involvement, the situation would have been much more difficult. I particularly positively assess the delivery of aid with parachutes. This was the only way to (?send aid) to some areas that are completely surrounded. Although the humanitarian situation is critical in almost all regions that are under the control of the legal organs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is nevertheless precisely because of the persistent and organized efforts by the government that certain progress has been made, and an even worse situation avoided, at least for the time being, which was our aim.

In our effort to transform the economic and financial system with quick and resolute moves, and adapt it to the demands of the war economy, the government has instructed the relevant departments to draw up a list of all available resources and facilities on the free territories in the shortest possible time so that they could be included in the system of defense for survival in an organized and coordinated way. Then, they were instructed to establish our energy resources and the minimum of needs for electric power, coal, oil, oil products, gas, and other energy resources, as well as embark on the revitalization and reconnection of the electric power system.

In addition, the government has outlined complex measures to identify social capital as state capital in order to protect it from illegal misappropriation and use it more efficiently for the needs of defense. These solutions are of a transient nature. The ultimate objective is the privatization of capital when objective conditions have been created for it. The tasks that have been set in this respect have already been partly accomplished, or work on their realization is intensively under way.

When the government presented its program in the inaugural session, we promised that we would approach the issues of the status and subsistence of the families of our soldiers and the killed and wounded members of the armed forces, and other victims of the war, with special attention and responsibility. In a relatively short period of time we adopted regulations and secured funds to solve these issues, at least partly, through special pensions, the payment of pensions and other income in kind, the establishment of a system of care and education for the children of members of the armed forces killed, and the provision of accommodation and other appropriate measures. This, of course, is only a small part of the responsibility that we took upon ourselves, and these issues will remain the priority in the future work of the government.

Regarding refugees and displaced persons, and the creation of conditions for their return, we have embarked on the drafting of regulations and setting up appropriate institutions so that this complex and long-tern problem could be dealt with systematically and in an organized way, not only as a humanitarian and social problem, but as a strategic issue for which the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is responsible.

The issue of organizing the functioning of the health service in times of war—the kind of war waged by the aggressors against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina—is extremely important. The government has not had much leeway for solving these issues, as all the problems present in the humanitarian situation and aid in general are reflected in the health service. The blocking of the humanitarian aid has had extremely dire consequences on the health service. The international community has been tolerating with incredible indulgence the open threats by the aggressors in connection with the delivery of medicine, sanitary and medical equipment, and the evacuation of the wounded. Our doctors and other medical staff have been working miracles in extreme hardship and without the most basic conditions. However, thanks to friendly countries, we have managed to obtain a minimal amount of medicine and sanitary materials. The arrival of the field hospital in Mostar will alleviate at least partly the intolerable conditions under which the wounded and the sick are treated in the free part of that city.

Esteemed deputies, times of war are not very favorable for any spectacular moves by the government in the fields of culture, science, or education. We have tried, through the appropriate ministries, to maintain the continuity of the education process in the conditions of war, primarily keeping in mind the security of the students, as the schools have become the aggressor's favorite targets. We have also undertaken measures to protect the staff, equipment, and other facilities in the sphere of science from further destruction.

As for culture, we have a phenomenon here worthy of attention. Despite the extremely unfavorable conditions, cultural life is not only being preserved but is also being promoted in European and international circles. That is one of the spheres that the government does not encourage much owing to its objectively limited resources. However, the cultural workers obviously understand this and are putting more into it than could be realistically expected.

As for the sphere of information, the most important activities of the government have been directed at providing factual and expeditious information to the domestic and international public about all the relevant events in the country. Through staffing, and the financial and technical strengthening of the media, the government has also tried to provide for their integration into a overall system. Through agreements with governments of friendly countries, and countries that have received our refugees, and through other forms of support and means, particularly Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina as the most profuse media, the government will do everything possible under the circumstances to enable information from the republic to reach the world. This has not been the case as yet.

Parallel with the intensive engagement in the peace process, the government has taken into account overall foreign policy, which is of particular importance under the circumstances. Our bilateral activities have been very intensive. We have been visited by the prime ministers of Pakistan and Turkey, foreign ministers of Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Croatia, and a number of ministers in charge of humanitarian aid, parliamentary delegations, other prominent politicians, and other prominent personalities and intellectuals from all over the world. As prime minister, I have visited Turkey, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Croatia. Our foreign minister has visited Hungary, Italy, Belgium, France, Turkey, Germany, and Austria, and has taken part in the work of the CSCE and the CEI [Central European Initiative]. The ministers for education, health, economics, and interior affairs have also made some important trips abroad. As for the next period, we have arranged visits to our most important partners, who influence the peace process in various constructive ways, or who give us their support and aid in preserving the independence and integrity of our country. The government has devoted a lot of attention to promoting relations with other countries. So far 75 countries have recognized Bosnia- Herzegovina, while diplomatic relations have been established with 45 of them. Eighteen countries have accredited ambassadors to Sarajevo. Bosnia-Herzegovina has opened 22 embassies, three missions within international organizations, and three general consulates. The public knows little about this, but it is of great importance for Bosnia-Herzegovina that it has become a member of a large number of international organizations over the period that this report covers, from UNESCO, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, the International Organization for Intellectual Property, the International Organization for Migration, and so on. Our country is a signatory to 172 international multilateral agreements and systems of the United Nations, and another 34 are being processed. The procedure of ratifying 16 conventions within the Council of Europe is under way. We have recently signed agreements on friendly cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey, while activities aimed at signing bilateral agreements with a number of other countries are in progress.

The government believes that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly should debate at one of its next sessions the strategic directions for our foreign policy engagements. The government will prepare an adequate platform for that. I would like to point out that over the last three months the government has undertaken concrete steps on the consolidation of the state's administration, the judiciary, and the advancement of law. The government was formed according to the criteria of competence and

ability, but also that of its members' loyalty to the struggle for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a relatively short time the republic's management has been successfully reorganized, and all the ministries have been changed to enable them to carry out their duties more efficiently. We have been working intensively and with some success on establishing effective vertical links among the state bodies, starting from the republic, through the regions to the communes, where the links had considerably weakened, and in some parts hardly existed. In that sense the establishment of ministerial coordinators for certain regions has proven useful. Apart from the constant presence of these ministerial coordinators, the practice is being established that other ministers and government officials should also frequently tour all the territories under our control, that is, under the control of the legitimate authorities. We will continue to develop this practice as it is one of the ways of overcoming occurrences of autarchy, individualist activities of local bodies, and in some cases disintegrating moves that weaken the necessary unity.

The government is speeding up its work on preparing regulations and other measures with which one would carry out certain changes in organizing the state structure, so that the state could function in a united way over the entire free territory and in the enclaves that are difficult to reach or those that are completely surrounded. We have demonstrated resolution in suppressing all forms of lawlessness and it is not immodest if I say that in strengthening the personal security of all citizens and security of their property, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the security organs of the Defense Ministry and the Army, judicial organs and other institutions of the system have made radical moves. Of course, I am far from claiming that the present situation is good, but it is a fact that there is a positive state of legality and that the state of personal security of all citizens and the security of their property cannot be compared with the situation that the government had been faced with at the beginning.

At the end of this expose, ladies and gentlemen deputies, I want briefly to present the basic aims of the government in the coming period. You have been given the program of work of the government and have the opportunity to observe and assess its topicality, the volume of work, and the significance of the (?tasks) that the government is facing. You have also been given the detailed programs of work as well as reports on the work of all ministries. We are probably facing a decisive period in which not only the further fate of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its peoples, but also the fate of every individual on this territory will depend.

The government is not going to change the basic concept of its policy. Our intention is to be a government that will achieve peace. In this respect, we are going to continue to make efforts and seek solutions that lead to the end of war. Because, nobody has more interest to achieve peace than we do, as the war is hitting us worst. In doing so we shall continue to seek support and cooperation of the international community, but we also remain open for dialogue with those political forces in Serbia and Croatia that are not being behind the great-state, nationalist, and conquering projects involving our republic. Vital links do not exist only between Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All peoples in the countries that appeared on the territory of the former Yugoslavia have interests in peace, prosperity, and mutual cooperation. This is the meaning of our call to the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro, as well as other internationally recognized states that came into being in the wake of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, to make decisions on mutual recognition. It is on this basis that everybody is given prospects that would replace war, hatred, killing, destruction, and poverty.

You are, however, still (?facing) aggression which is not an ordinary war, but genocide—a lot has been said about it here—and destruction of all civilizational, spiritual, and material achievements. As long as this aggression is going on we have to oppose it, we must defend ourselves, because it is the natural right of every state and every man. We do not need the army to conquer foreign territories, but are going to do everything with a view to having an army that would successfully defend the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are invariable points in the government's policy, esteemed deputies, which it presents in this report to you, and I suggest to you to support us in this respect. Thank you.

Karadzic Ready to Negotiate Demilitarization

LD0702201094 Paris France-2 Television Network in French 1900 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Satellite television interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in Pale by correspondent Jacques Merlino in a Paris studio on 7 February—recorded; Karadzic speaks in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed French translation]

[Text] The Bosnian Serb leader remains as arrogant as ever. Radovan Karadzic is offering to negotiate the demilitarization of Sarajevo. Jacques Merlino spoke to him this evening:

[Karadzic] Yes, we plan, within the framework of the overall arrangement for finding peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular in Sarajevo, to place Sarajevo itself under the jurisdiction of the United Nations for a period of 30 years. But only Sarajevo itself, because what is most important for us is to guarantee the security of the Serbian areas of the town so that they are not attacked, and also to avoid the kind of massacres which have already been suffered in other Serb-populated areas. We intend to do everything possible to ensure that peace is found first in Sarajevo and then throughout Bosnia.

[Merlino] Do you accept the order to pull back your heavy artillery and to place it under UN control?

[Karadzic] If peace comes to Sarajevo, Serbian artillery, just as Muslim artillery, will effectively be controlled by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] at locations decided upon by UNPROFOR. Having said this, without signing an overall peace, it is impossible for us to completely withdraw our artillery. We are for peace but the Muslims are not. They want to continue the war, and we therefore need the guarantee that the Muslims will also withdraw their heavy weaponry.

Karadzic Holds News Conference on Sarajevo

LD0702213894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2142 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—At a news conference in Sarajevo today, Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic described the U.S. Administration's request that Saturday's crime at a Sarajevo market be investigated as "based on principles." [passage omitted]

Commenting on the talks yesterday with Akashi, Stoltenberg, and Owen, Karadzic said that a draft agreement on placing Sarajevo under a UN protectorate and on putting an end to the fighting in the area had been a good idea, but that it had never been signed due to the behavior of the Muslim side.

"We are ready to revive this issue in Geneva on 10 February in order to reach a partial peace, since the solution of the Sarajevo issue would lead to the resolution of the conflict in other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina too," Karadzic said. [passage omitted]

Cites 'Staged' Market Attack

AU0702202294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic has held a news conference. He said that the Serbian side had a legitimate right to defend itself by all means. If we are attacked from the air, we would not suffer the strikes with our arms crossed, said Radovan Karadzic, who demanded a thorough investigation of the Sarajevo tragedy:

[Begin Karadzic recording] The reaction of the [UN] secretary general and the entire international community to the tragic massacre in the Sarajevo market is precisely the way the Muslims expected it to be. Such a reaction particularly encourages the Muslims to repeat this massacre, which is not the first in a series of massacres that have occurred with the aim of compromising the Serbs.

We fully understand the emotional side of all this. We are disgusted by this crime and condemn it most adamantly, calling resolutely for an international commission consisting of the experts from countries that are in no way interested in the outcome of the entire crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the Russians, the Japanese, the Indians, and the Chinese, with one Muslim and one Serbian representative. We not only demand a ballistic analysis, we also demand a forensic analysis, that is to say, that an international and objective commission of forensic experts determines the reasons and the time of death of all these victims. Namely, we have had some indications that all in all this has been staged to disrupt the international community. Not merely this incident, but any further incidents must, in our opinion, be investigated thoroughly by an objective commission, which will naturally also comprise one Serb and one Muslim. Only in such a way will the international community not stumble in the dark in search of the culprit.

Regarding the attack, even if the Muslim side is responsible for it, that is, if the UN firmly establishes that the Muslim side is responsible, it is perfectly clear to us that the Muslim side has done it, I do not know what good air strikes would do. I think that it is much better to have a commission and international pressure exerted on those who avoid a political solution and, on the eve of each conference, commit great crimes in order to sabotage the peace conference.

We shall not make the political negotiations more difficult in any way. We are interested in accomplishing peace as soon as possible. We have had some indications so far that a bomb could have been thrown from a nearby building, that this bomb alone was not of 120-mm caliber, but was wrapped in a great quantity of plastic explosive and, as such, thrown from the 21 Decembar building nearby. Naturally, we must work further on the proof, and it would be the best if the expert group consisting of ballistics and forensic experts concentrates on an examination of the reasons and circumstances of this massacre, which we highly praise, be correctly informed. [sentence as heard]

We shall do our best to inform them correctly of everything that is happening. The Serbian side has a legitimate right to defend itself by all means. If we are attacked from the air, we will defend ourselves by all means and would not tolerate strikes without defense. [end recording]

Warns About Safety of Foreigners

LD0702183594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1709 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—"The Serb side has a legitimate right to defend itself with every available means; if we are attacked from the air we will not sit idly by," president of the Srpska republic Radovan Karadzic said at a news conference this evening.

"We now have firm control of our army and we can guarantee the safety of foreigners in our republic, but in the event of an attack elements of chaos would emerge and I am not sure that any foreigners in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be safe—not because we would issue such orders, but because the people would treat foreigners as enemies, which they really would be, in a way," Karadzic said.

Speaking about the letter sent to NATO by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, Karadzic said that such a reaction in fact encouraged the Muslims to reapply the same war methodology, for—as he put it—this was not the first massacre, and it was established that some had been committed by the Muslims themselves [sentence as received]. Karadzic said that the Serbs completely understand the emotional side of this tragedy, which they have condemned in the most vehement terms.

"We demand a rigorous investigation to identify the perpetrators of the crime—once that has been done the international community will not have to grope in the dark. This is why this case should be investigated in great detail, not only from the ballistic, but also from the forensic aspect for there are some indications that this was another case of a stage-managed event," President Karadzic said.

Krajisnik Rejects Serb Responsibility

AU0702151694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] In an interview for a Netherlands daily, DE VOLKSKRAND, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Assembly of the Srpska republic, spoke, among other things, about the massacre that took place in Sarajevo on Saturday [5 February].

[Begin Krajisnik recording] We do not have any information at present. The only thing that we know is that the Serbian side did not do it. However, we have some indications, suspicions, that there is even a possibility of this having been committed by a third side, neither the Serbian nor the Muslim side, but a side that does not want an agreement to be reached between the Muslims and the Serbs. We had been on a very good way to signing a document similar to the document and the statement signed between the Serbs and the Croats, and just at the time of this rapprochement, we found ourselves in the situation of these talks being undermined. We cannot say what forces these are. There are too many interested parties that would want the war to continue here and that do not want rapprochement between the Muslims and the Serbs. [end recoding]

Serb General on 'Staged Massacre' by Muslims

AU0702162094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Telephone interview with General Milan Gvero, deputy chief of the general staff of the Srpska republic army, by Slobodan Jankovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Jankovic] Mr. General, are there any new results in the investigation concerning the perpetrators of the massacre in Sarajevo?

[Gvero] We do not have any new results, except what has already been said in connection with this obviously staged massacre by the Muslims. As you know, the representatives of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] were also unable to say anything more specific, because, really, they have nothing new to say. If they did have something to say this time, it appears this would have to be only in terms of an explanation and clarification that the Serbian side is not involved in this in any way.

[Jankovic] How do you explain the refusal by both the Muslim side and General Ramsey for you to set up a joint commission of experts?

[Gvero] The reason for this most probably lies in the fact that the Muslims think that the analyses of an impartial commission would prove that they staged the incident. This is why they did not accept it. When the news of the massacre was first aired, we were in the airport building and immediately suggested that a joint commission be set up. They rejected it 15 minutes later. They obviously hold the view that the findings of an impartial commission would not support them and are therefore rejecting it.

[Jankovic] Mr. General, what does such a bloody move—the shelling of civilians causing worldwide indignation—mean from a military point of view?

[Gvero] I am sure that this primarily means the prolongation of the Muslim war option, their lack of readiness to make steps toward peace, and the encouragement of their belief that they can solve something with war, by prolonging the war, probably counting on some encouragement and support from outside.

There is not a single rational reason as to why they would do this, why civilians would be killed by those who are supposed to be protecting them, not killing them. However, when one thinks about it, one can see that they have support for such a course of action in Alija's Islamic Declaration, which clearly states that as far as a religious war is concerned, such as the one they are waging now, sacrifices are not important and neither are the numbers nor the quality.

Commentary Analyzes Reasons Behind Massacre

AU0702160694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] What prompted the Serb fascists to commit a new and by far the largest massacre of civilians since the outbreak of the war is a challenge for all conscientious analysts. The chetniks knew that—upon seeing the large number of killed and badly wounded people at the Markale market—the U.S. Government would immediately hold an extraordinary session and that the demands by the international community for air strikes against the positions of Karadzic's Serbs would become more urgent. They not only decided to lob the shell on the place where most of the Sarelians gather, but they did it deliberately, following a detailed project concocted not in Pale, of course, but in Belgrade.

So what was the real motive for this crime? This is the topic of today's editorial commentary.

[Unidentified commentator] Some believe that this was a desperate move, as all the chetnik offensives have been crushed, and the Croatian Council in Sarajevo (has broken off ties) with Mate Boban, Karadzic's main ally in the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Others believe that this was an attempt to provoke our negotiators into giving up in Geneva. [sentence as heard] Others—and most foreigners are in this group—believe that this is the culmination of the psychological pressure exerted on Sarelians to give up further resistance.

The majority of people, however, believe that this was really a manipulation with the Serbs, this time devilishly planned. Such a monstrous crime in front of the entire world community is meant to cut off any retreat that the forcefully mobilized youths in Karadzic's army might have, youths who have realized what a bloody mess they have been forced into. The message to them is: Try to go over to the other side. After such a crime, the Muslims will slaughter you.

There is, of course, no need to mention that this shell, just like all the previous ones fired at Sarajevo, wanted to provoke hatred and retaliation against the Serbs who are Bosnian patriots, particularly those in Sarajevo. These Serbs have shown the world that coexistence is possible; the entire concept of greater Serbia collapsed on that. Analysts say that Milosevic, Karadzic, and the rest of their gang hate no one as much as they do these honorable and proud people.

However, even though all these reasons stand, the main reason is of a political nature. Milosevic has promised the impoverished, hungry, and miserable Serbians that the sanctions will be lifted soon and that normal life will resume. Now he has to tell them that the worst is yet to come. Since the Serbian regime and their puppets in Pale will never voluntarily return the territories laid to waste through an act of genocide and give up new conquests and crimes, the tightening of sanctions is inevitable, while air strikes against their positions still remain a possibility. Try to put yourselves in the shoes of the Serbian rulers now when they have to explain to the people who is to be blamed for their catastrophic situation. Since the rulers of the fascist regime treat their subjects as if they were mentally retarded, their explanation is: Well, see, the Muslims have again massacred their own people and caused the wrath of the international community against the Serbs. That was how they explained the introduction of the sanctions. According to them, the sanctions had nothing to do with Serbia's aggression, massacres of defenseless people by the heavily armed Serb army, concentration camps, and the mass liquidation of camp inmates. According to them, the sanctions were imposed after the allegedly plotted massacre of one own's people on Vase Miskina Street in May 1992.

The circle of lies, deceits, and crimes of the greater Serbian fascists is now closed, and the Markale market and the scene of the Vase Miskina Street massacre are near each other, very near. They are barely 100 meters apart, and they will be a monument to the evil, brutality, and corruption of this new type of fascism. Symbolically, this is an act much stronger than the burning of the Reich Stag and the false Polish attack on the German border post, as engineered by Hitler's Nazis.

Mate Boban Resigns as Herceg-Bosna President

LD0802115094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Josko Krizelj report from Livno]

[Excerpt] I have decided to place my mandate as president of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna at the disposal of this assembly until further notice. A presidential council will assume the duties of president and will appoint an acting president. Mate Boban said this at the end of his introductory speech at an extraordinary session of the Chamber of Deputies of Herceg-Bosna's Assembly. I will stay with you, Boban said, ending his speech. [passage omitted]

Explains Resignation Decision

LD0802140894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Mate Boban, president of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, placed the office of president at the disposal of the assembly until further notice at an extraordinary session of the chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna.

[Begin Boban recording] I have decided to place the office of president of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna at the disposal of the assembly until further notice. My duties will be carried out by the presidential council which will appoint one of its members to represent the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. [end recording]

Explaining his decision, Boban said that the most influential international players have been misled due to a lack of information and he believes that certain politicians, and not the will of the Croat nation, stand in the way of a multicultural, multiethnic, and unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. This belief of the international public, which leads to growing pressure on the Republic of Croatia, is the reason why Boban had offered to resign.

[Begin Boban recording] I am saying this at the beginning so that those who believe in other interpretations in the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not describe this as a result of [word indistinct]. [end recording]

I will stay with you, Boban said at the end of his speech, in which he recalled that the will of the Croat nation in Bosnia- Herzegovina was defined two years ago in a referendum formulated in Livno, which approved Bosnia-Herzegovina, not as a unitary state but as one in which the Croat nation would have equal rights and the right to self-determination. We still support Bosnia-Herzegovina as a union of three republics, because we

enabled it to survive by defending 35 percent of its territory. However, the Serbs and the Muslims do not want this Bosnia-Herzegovina anymore.

Boban also mentioned the meetings of self-proclaimed Croat assemblies and he said that this assembly is the only legitimate representative of the Croats' will in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

Croat Assembly Focuses on 'Self-Determination'

LD0802111694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Report by Zdenko Vranjes]

[Excerpts] The extraordinary session of the chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna began at 1000 in the packed hall of the People's University in Livno. Members of former chamber of citizens of the Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly are also present at the session as well as members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Miro Lasic, Franjo Boras and Fikret Abdic. Representatives of the Catholic Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina, municipal governments of Herceg-Bosna and numerous organizations of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina are also present.

Members of the state delegation of the Republic of Croatia, headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mate Granic are also attending the session. [passage omitted]

There is only one item on the agenda: the current military and political situation of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina's struggle for its rights and survival. In his introductory speech, the president of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the Croat Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mate Boban, recalled that two years ago the well-known Livno referendum question was formulated which rejected the unitary organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and proclaimed the basic will of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Equal rights and a right to self-determination. Boban said that this basic goal had not been abandoned.

'Three-Level Federal State' Proposed

AU0702213594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Mladen Bosnjak report on news conference by the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats in Sarajevo on 7 February—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Bosnjak] The assembly of the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina was successfully organized and went well. Some 595 participants were invited, 35 of whom were guests. Some 362 participants took part in the session here in Sarajevo, 26 of the invited participants were in Zenica on a direct telephone line. Twenty-two participants arrived from Zagreb, four from Germany, and four from the United States.

The assembly adopted several documents—the decision on the negotiations for the solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the decision on the participation of Croats in the representative bodies and bodies of authority, and the declaration of the Council. A Croatian National Council was also formed as the executive body of the assembly of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The assembly presented a completely concrete proposal for the future organization of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The assembly participants claim that this proposal does not support Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary republic, that it is not at the detriment of the Serbs in the territorial sense, that it annuls all the excuses the aggressor found for carrying out the aggression, and that it offers a territorial organization that enables the return of the refugees and the evicted people.

[Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member] Ivo Komsic, chairman of the Croatian National Council, told the correspondents about the territorial organization of the republic, the structuring of the state authority—starting from communes, to cantons, and possible republics—and the necessary federal authorities.

[Komsic] The Croatian assembly that took place yesterday adopted a concept of a reorganization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could remove the causes of the war, which could remove the reasons behind the conquests of other people's territories—that is, the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory—as the fundamental cause of the war. This map shows that. These numbers depict these territorial units in a three-level federal state—as we propose for Bosnia-Herzegovina—which represent full autonomous units or cantons, and they would be directly connected with each other through the Federal Assembly. The authorities would, therefore, be unified but broken down into 17 autonomous units, while Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka as extra territorial status as the most important and largest cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with an ethnically mixed population.

What is important to say here is that we presented this proposal of a three-level federal state as the grounds for another option that could be discussed during further negotiations, and that is to reorganize the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a federal state with four levels of authority. We have left this proposal open for the simple reason that we want to respect the positive results of the negotiating processes on Bosnia-Herzegovina so far. [sentence as heard]

[Bosnjak] As for the legitimacy of the Croatian assembly and the Croatian National Council, Bozidar Matic said the following:

[Matic] In times of war, assemblies such as this one cannot meet the strict requirements for legitimacy as set out in times of peace, when deputies are counted for a quorum, and so on. I know there will be questions as to how legal this Croatian National Council is and the way it was elected, and I would like to say one thing: Not one party that won power at the last elections had the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its program.

Therefore, whoever and however elected—if he works on the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a country—he has lost all legitimacy.

[Bosnjak] [passage omitted on the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences and its Bosnia-Herzegovina counterpart demanding end of war and respect of human rights] The correspondents did not have many questions, but they all referred to the proposal for the territorial organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most important of the replies is the one that contained the hope and conviction that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly will support at today's session the proposal of the assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, which would strengthen the negotiating positions in Geneva of those who support a united Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croats 'Forcibly Mobilized' in Zenica

LD0702154994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] A forced mobilization of Croats is being carried out in Zenica, the Croatian Defense Council's Zenica information service has reported. The Croats forcibly mobilized by the Muslim army are being sent to the front lines and forced to shoot at their dearest ones—fathers, brothers, and sons. Recalcitrant Croats and those refusing to be mobilized are being arrested in large numbers.

The building housing the Croatian cultural center, which is a symbol of Croatian struggle, has been turned into a Muslim forces' military building. Before that it was a frequent target of Muslim fire. The Croatian population of Zenica is quietly resisting all forms of imposed Muslim authority.

Muslim Artillery Using 'Chlorine-Based Gases'

LD0702162894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Report by correspondent Zdenko Vranjes]

[Text] Artillery and infantry fighting in the area of Kiseljak and Kresevo and in the vicinity of Novi Travnik intensified this morning. Infantry clashes were most intense around Kresevo where last night the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] repelled a powerful infantry attack by Muslim forces, inflicting huge losses on the attackers.

This morning Muslim artillery has pounded villages around Kiseljak. Civilians were wounded in the village of Lepenica but no exact casuality figures are yet available.

Novi Travnik and the surrounding villages, especially the village of Rastoci and Relej hill, again came under artillery and mortar attacks from the Muslim army. HVO military sources have said that in these attacks the Muslim army has been using shells filled with chlorine-based toxic gases.

At 0800 this morning a general alert was sounded in Mostar again. In mortar attacks by Muslims on the western part of Mostar [Croat-held] yesterday and throughout the night four civilians were wounded.

Tesanj Muslims Issue Anti-Izetbegovic Statement

LD0702193294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1854 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Banja Luka, Feb 7 (TANJUG)—Moslems from Tesanj, in the north of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, publicly expressed their opposition to the policy of the Bosnian Moslem fundamentalist leader Alija Izetbegovic after a six-month silent resistance.

In a local radio programme monitored in the neighbouring Serb town of Banja Luka a proclamation was read accusing Izetbegovic of a policy of war with the creation of an Islamic state, a jamahiriya, in Bosnia-Herzegovina as its main objective.

"The policy carried out by Izetbegovic so far has brought us to the verge of a catastrophe ... we could have separated from each other and remained in peace with the Serbs and the Croats, but they started to stir us up, to teach us that we are of Moslem origin and that particularily the Serbs have been our century-old enemies", the proclamation reads.

Emphasizing that they wanted neither an autonomy nor a jamahiriya the Moslems from Tesanj called on their countrymen in Bosnia- Herzegovina to stand up against those who are for the continuation of bloodshed which will result in their eradication.

"Do not let them push us into a prolonged war against the Serbs", the proclamation states calling on the Islamic fundamentalists to leave the Tesanj area and to let the local Moslems continue to live in peace with or besides the Serbs and the Croats.

"We shall reach an agreement with the Serbs, let us not allow the fundamentalists to change our language and our culture", the Moslems from Tesanj said adding that they did not wish to prevent those who wanted to continue fighting for the "crazy ideas of a state founded on Islam".

The proclamation is the most direct confirmation of numerous indications in the last few months about the resistance of the local Moslems from Tesanj to Izetbegovic's policy.

There are also reports about agitations within the 110th Brigade of the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO), stationed in the Tesanj area, whose representatives contact units of the Bosnian Serbs more and more frequently with the aim of reaching a peace settlement.

These efforts have so far not yielded results because of the resistance of the Islamic fundamentalists dominating the Moslem units, loyal to Izetbegovic in the Tesanj area.

Srpska Republic To Join FRY Monetary System

LD0702181794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1635 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Jagodina, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—Vladimir Lukic, prime minister of the Srpska republic, announced today that the republic is joining the monetary system of Yugoslavia.

"The Srpska republic will as of tomorrow be a part of the united, reconstructed monetary system together with Serbia and Montenegro, which means that payments will be made in the super dinar," Lukic told Jagodina Radio. [passage omitted]

Opposition Condemns Serbo-Croatian Agreement

AU0702175194 Rijeka NOVI LIST (TJEDNI NOVI LIST Supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 94 p I

[Article by Gojko Marinkovic: "Signatures From Foggy Karadjordjevo"]

[Text] We cannot remember the last time when [Croatian President] Franjo Tudjman was so cheery, excited, joyful, euphoric, and even somewhat melancholic, as he was last Wednesday, when in Geneva the declaration on the gradual normalization of the relations between the republic of Croatia and the FRY was signed. The return to the same state as 16 months ago, when a similar, but even more precise, agreement between Tudjman and [the then President of FRY] Dobrica Cosic was signed, has been assessed by the Croatian president as the most important document after the UN Security Council's Resolution 871. He also thinks that [Serbian Foreign Minister] Vladislav Jovanovic's signature in Milosevic's presence is actually the recognition of the sovereign Croatia, which opens possibilities for the inclusion of the UN Protection Areas [UNPAs] in the constitutional-legal system of Croatia in a peaceful way, and also that it is an enormous success of the Croatian policy that has improved the Croatian image in the world.

On hearing the news, most Croatian citizens felt surprised and confused, to put it mildly, and many of them wondered: What is that supposed to mean? The first TV opinion surveys, although probably well edited in favor of the president's policy, showed that people are already fed up with such and similar documents, because that was already the 77th meeting of the international community. In addition to such skepticism, and the usual answer "well, so far they have signed many documents," one could notice a certain relief, and desire that the war be finally brought to an end soon. So, as far as citizens are concerned, the support was quite spiritless and lethargic, but it cannot be said that Tudjman did not get it.

The Tide of Disagreements From the Opposition

The entire tide of disagreements, criticisms, and remarks have, therefore, been delivered by the opposition parties. The most vociferous, but also the most categorical, has been Drazen Budisa, chairman of the strongest opposition party, the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS]: "There is no justification for a policy that seeks an ally in the aggressor, while seeking an enemy in the other victim of the aggression. In that sense, we think that a priority of the Croatian state should be the accomplishment of an agreement with the political leadership of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, while this declaration will make the accomplishment of that agreement difficult. The relations with the FRY can become normal again only when the FRY recognizes the Croatian state within its internationally recognized borders, which is not done by this document," Budisa claims.

Slavko Mestrovic, secretary of the Croatian People's Party, welcomes the deceleration in the case if it leads toward a just peace, the reintegration of the occupied Croatian territories, the return of the refugees to their homes, and the cessation of the war. "Croatia has very unpleasant experiences with Milosevic's regime. Some initiatives not only failed to bring about the expected improvements, but also helped Milosevic to recover and regain strength precisely at the moments when he was in the most difficult situation. He adroitly used those initiatives to preserve the regime in Serbia, as well as to improve the image of himself and Serbia in international public opinion. I am afraid that the same thing will happen now, because I firmly believe that Milosevic has not given up the platform of a greater Serbia. On the contrary, he cannot go back any more, since he has burnt all his bridges. He knows that a tribunal awaits him, to try him as a war criminal.

"Although the declaration does not mention Bosnia-Herzegovina, it may mean a certain political pressure aimed at forcing a settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Mestrovic explains his party's attitude.

Who Will Be Eating Grass?

However, the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia [SDP] believes that, through this document, and above all by the announced opening of the governmental offices of the two states, the so-called FRY is de facto recognized, while, on the Croatian part, the initiative has been made for the sanctions to be lifted, being so far the only form of international pressure that has been put on the regime that actually carried out the aggression against Croatia, as well as against other neighboring countries, the regime that has been defined by the whole world as fascist, the regime in which human rights are brazenly ignored.

The Croatian signature on the document has actually strengthened and stabilized that regime. The SDP also raises a series of questions regarding the reported positive experiences in the joint efforts to speed up the peace process in former Yugoslavia, which is the basic goal of the declaration. "When did Milosevic make a peace-making move, when and where did he ever give up the concept of greater Serbia? When did he recognize Croatia in its internationally recognized borders? Did he not, only a month ago, organize elections on the territory of the state with which he has just signed the declaration? Is he not supporting the aggression these days against the Croatian enclaves in Bosnia- Herzegovina? When these questions receive answers we shall be happy to open, not only government offices in neighboring Serbia, but many other offices. At this moment, we cannot accept any legitimization of those who evidently committed the crime, while never doing anything to dissociate themselves from those crimes," the SPD officials say, stating their attitude.

The Croatian Peasants' Party [HSS] thinks that the 77th meeting in Geneva with Milosevic the Balkan Conqueror is neither the last, nor the first meeting, in the

context of the Croatian triumphalism on one hand, and Byzantine maneuvers on the other. "We are afraid that the document is a piece of paper without guarantees. It is about Milosevic's policy that aims at finally contouring greater Serbia, for which he and his subjects are ready to eat grass [as published], and finally, it is about all the games regarding the possible lifting of the sanctions. Of course, an important factor is also the pressure by the international community that the issue of Bosnia should finally be settled, that is, it's partition. However, any agreement without the accord of the third party—this time it is Muslims—leaves Bosnia to play its role of the land of death, where the war continues, to the disadvantage of the Croatian people as well," the HSS reacts to the agreement.

Zagreb-Knin-Belgrade

The reactions of other parties have been similar, but it is discernible in these quoted statements that one dilemma dominates in the majority of the criticisms, which is: Is the Croatian Government allowed to negotiate with war criminals and the regime that attacked Croatian territory? Milosevic is simply not to be trusted, while Tudjman is customarily reproached that he is actually rescuing Milosevic, while this time those accusations are going so far that Tudjman is being accused of pushing the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia. The other two crucial questions have to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina. True, Minister Jovanovic did state that the reintegration of Krajina into Croatia should be discussed at the Zagreb-Knin level, meaning that the issue of Krajina is an internal affair of Croatia, but have the Krajina presidential elections not been carried out precisely in Belgrade recently? True, in Croatia there are few statements expressing whether Milan Martic, who, in the second round, almost beat the already elected Milan Babic, would be more convenient than somebody else, but everybody knows that Martic is Milosevic's protegee, and that he, with his attitudes, perfectly fits in with the concept of greater Serbia, that is, the union of all Serbian states. Besides, the Serbian state-run television also considers Krajina to be a Serbian territory, so, for instance, in TV weather forecasts Krajina is regularly shown on the chart as a part of Yugoslavia, while Zadar is a part of Krajina. Still, there are people who think that Martic's win is good for Croatia, because he, being Milosevic's direct vassal, must be obedient. Nevertheless, in any case, Serbian official policy has not so far by a single move shown that Tudjman is right in claiming that the Geneva declaration is the first step toward the reintegration of Krajina, which is a primary thing for him, because, in a certain way, he has given up Bosnia-Herzegovina, contenting himself with something that has never been questioned.

Croatia Has Recognized the Serbian Republic

Not only the Croatian opposition, but also many foreign media houses, and even diplomats, have assessed that the Croato-Serbian agreement constitutes a pressure on Muslims, so that Zvonko Lerotic, the president's personal adviser, states that "the Muslims are thereby forced to make similar agreements with Croats and Serbs, because it is suicide to wage war with two states that are about to find a common language." By this statement, Lerotic has almost confirmed the speculations that the agreement is about a military alliance of Croats and Serbs. Such theories, which are not alone in the international press, find support in another agreement that was also signed in Geneva—which the Croatian opposition ostensibly did not notice, to the great surprise and almost astonishment of all, and consequently did not comment on, although the integral text was published in Croatian newspapers—the agreement signed between Mile Akmadzic, on behalf of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and Nikola Koljevic, on behalf of the Serbian Republic, in which both sides emphasize that "there are no disputed issues between them that cannot be solved in a peaceful way."

Quote: "Two republics have decided to establish diplomatic relations, so that the Serbian Republic will open an office in Mostar, while the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna will open an office in Sarajevo (Pale)."

Thus Croatia has actually eliminated the quotation marks from such terms as so-called, self-called, or self-proclaimed, thereby recognizing not only the FRY, but also the Serbian Republic.

In that act, many people are likely to see only a logical course of what was happening as early as in 1990 in Karadjordjevo, when Tudjman and Milosevic discussed, for the first time, the partition of Bosnia. However, as for the Croats and what they have now (of course, provided that no secret annex to the agreement exists), they did not need the war, because by it they only lost, rather than profited. Of course, the fact that Croatia did not start the war remains undisputed, but many are confused by the fact that the erstwhile ally has become the main enemy now, and cannot explain why that happened.

The Croatian estimates say that, by the Geneva agreement, the possibility of the second Serbo-Croatian war, which the foreign experts were quite positive might break out in spring, has been thereby removed, but, when speaking of Muslims, all possibilities remain open. One possibility is that Muslims accept what they are offered, and become reconciled with their defeat, because, as Lerotic says, it is insane to wage a war with two states that have come to an agreement. The second option is that the Muslims will continue the war, and accomplish at least some of their aspirations with the help of the international community that is not so unwilling to help them as is represented by both the Croatian and Serbian media.

Not a Single Shell Fell on Serbia

Furthermore, when we add to all this the problems regarding the access to sea that is demanded by both the Serbian and the Muslim sides in Bosnia, when the questions of Bosnian Posavina [Bosnian side of the Sava

River basin] and central Bosnia are still open to a degree, when the hostility among all three factions still exists, and above all that there are the issues of Sandzak, Kosovo, and Macedonia, then it can be said that the Geneva piece of paper is just a tiny step toward peace, and still far away from being called an historic one. Far more palpable proofs than, say, the reestablishment of the telephone connections between the FRY and Croatia will be necessary in order for us to be able to speak of the start of a peace process. Because, the Geneva signatures may as well be the beginning of an even more fierce war, even initiating new conflicts. That is to say, an attentive listener and reader may also have heard in the statements made by the FRY officials assessments that the declaration makes it possible for Yugoslavia and Serbia "to get down to settling other problems as well." It is obvious that it is not only the economy that those assessments refer to, although it is one of the key reasons why Milosevic needs a reconciliation with the West, and a deal with Tudjman regarding the lifting of the sanctions. Whether Milosevic will return the favor by relinquishing Krajina and recognizing Croatia in its internationally recognized borders is the key that will make it possible for Serbia to get down to settling those other problems.

What is particularly bothersome in all these options is that nobody in Croatia sees any reasonable alternative to Milosevic's regime, because now one can hear the bellicose sounds coming from the Serbian opposition lines as well. To a certain degree, the case is similar with the Croatian opposition, since it refuses any negotiations with war criminals, and, as a rule, is quite skeptical toward the Geneva declaration.

This "certain degree" refers above all to the unquestionable fact that not a single shell fell on Serbian ground during the war that was actually never officially declared, whereas one third of the Croatian territory is, as a matter of fact, devastated, while Croatia as a state is reduced to a few pieces of land. Moreover, Croatia is probably the only UN member-country, in addition to Bosnia-Herzegovina where the state is even more catastrophic, that does not know either what its territory is or how many citizens it has.

Croats 'Still Violating' Cease-Fire

LD0702131194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1237 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Knin, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—Croatian forces are still violating the cease-fire in the Benkovac area on the northern Dalmatian battlefront.

The main headquarters of the Serb Krajina army has reported that they opened fire on the area around the village of Biljani Gornji from recoilless guns and howitzers. Due to the intensity of fire, and because the soldiers, weapons and equipment of the Serb side were endangered, the Serb side was forced to respond. A statement says that while returning fire the Serb side destroyed one tank and one antiaircraft gun belonging to the aggressor.

The main headquarters of the Serb Krajina army warns that Croatia is using the cease-fire to regroup and bring in fresh forces and equipment to this section of the battlefield.

Diplomatic Incident With Envoy to B-H Protested

LD0702154094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, today sent a letter to the UN secretary-general's special envoy, Yasushi Akashi, sharply protesting against incidents that occurred on 5 February at the airports in Split and Sarajevo.

On that occasion some UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] low-ranking officials and officers refused to allow Zdravko Sancevic, Croatian ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and several other Croats to enter Sarajevo, thus preventing Ambassador Sancevic from carrying out his duties. It is inconceivable that an ambassador should not be allowed to enter the capital of the country to which he is accredited, regardless of whether he is stopped by the government of the host country or officials representing an international organization such as the United Nations, Granic said. He also expressed understanding for the problems faced by UNPROFOR in the implementation of their task and the hope that incidents like the ones of 5 February would not happen again.

In his letter to Akashi, Granic also expresses deep concern and personal regret over the tragedy at Sarajevo market, stressing that the Croatian Government sharply condemns such barbarian acts directed against innocent civilians. To prevent further escalation of chaos, violence, and suffering, the Croatian Government has called on all sides immediately to cease hostilities and return to the peace negotiations. The Croatian Government also calls on the international community to use all available means, including force, to stop tragic clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is said among other things in Granic's letter to Yasushi Akashi.

Tudjman Receives Slovene Prime Minister

LD0702152394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] In the presidential palace today Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, received Janez Drnovsek, prime minister of the Republic of Slovenia, who had previously held talks with the Croatian Government delegation about relations between the two countries. Agreements on bilateral cooperation were also signed, the president's office has announced.

The two prime ministers, Janez Drnovsek and Nikica Valentic, informed President Tudjman about the agreements the two delegations signed during their talks. Both prime ministers agreed that their meeting today signified a major step in the further rapprochement between the two states and in building confidence and trade cooperation, in particular. The views of the two sides on a number of outstanding problems such as the border issue and Ljubljanska Banka [the Ljubljana Bank] converged even further today. These issues are expected to be resolved soon for the benefit of both sides.

At the end of the meeting President Tudjman and Prime Minister Drnovsek spoke about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the possibilites for resolving the crisis in the area of former Yugoslavia.

The Slovene prime minister was accompanied by his Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle and Slovene Ambassador to Croatia Matija Valesic. In addition to Prime Minister Valentic, on the Croatian side the talks were attended by Jure Radic, head of President Tudjman's office; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mate Granic; Croatian Ambassador to Slovenia Miljenko Zagar; President Tudjman's foreign policy adviser Zeljko Matic, and his aide-de-camp Brigadier Kresimir Kaspar.

Valentic, Drnovsek Sign Agreements

LD0702141494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] The prime ministers of the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia, Nikica Valentic and Janez Drnovsek respectively, signed in Zagreb six agreements on cooperation in various fields. Intensive talks over the past few weeks resulted in the regulation of future relations between the two countries in the sphere of education, culture, employement, and judiciary, cooperation in sea fishing, and economic and trade relations.

Ater the talks between the two prime ministers and their associates and after the agreements were signed in Banski Dvori in Zagreb, both prime ministers expressed satisfaction with the progress made in relations between the two countries. According to them, today's talks are the result of several months of hard work and meetings between experts and state officials. At the same time, the talks are an added impetus for solving the remaining problems. Both also said that there are no disputed issues or unsolvable problems beween the two countries.

The Croatian prime minister also said that it was understandable that both countries were interested in cooperation because we are encouraged to cooperate by tradition and other interests. Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek added that both countries would benefit from more intense cooperation, especially in the field of economy.

Article Views Political Options in Krajina

AU0702192094 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 94 p 12

[Article by Srdjan Radulovic: "Martic Is Being Tested"]

[Text] After the election, the everyday life in Krajina is still characterized by consideration of the political outcome of the conflict between the two Milans—Martic, the Krajina president, and Babic, the leader of the strongest party in parliament. If they do not reach a compromise, the Krajina political scene could turn into a merciless struggle between the two enemy camps. The continuation of the media campaign against Babic, also supported by television reporters and politicians from the Socialist Party of Serbia, points to this possibility. According to the method used so far, public opinion is being prepared for the message that Babic is to blame for a parliamentary crisis that could happen if his party does not support the personnel changes proposed by President Martic.

A coalition between Babic's Socialist Democratic Party (SDS) of Krajina with 30 seats in parliament, and the Radical Party with 16 is the only one that could possibly achieve the simple majority of 84 representatives. The creation of this coalition was announced before the election by both Babic and the Radical Party. After the second election round, Babic's supporters had the feeling, however, that the Radical Party did not keep it's promise to vote for Babic in the election, so that there is now suspicion about this coalition. Lazar Macura, a SDS Krajina representative, said in a statement for BORBA that he could not assess the behavior of the Radical Party members in the election in general, but that "it seemed to him that not everybody voted for Babic."

Who Will Be the Prime Minister?

"Babic and Vojislav Seselj agreed on the coalition, and I do not believe that they will change their attitude, especially because the Radical Party wants to have one leadership, so that there will be no postion of party chairman for Krajina. On the other hand, it is also possible that some members of parliament might change to some other party, but this cannot lead to an imbalance of power," Macura says.

In his opinion, it is quite logical that Martic propose a new prime minister from the SDS Krajina. Asked what he thinks about opinions that this function could be offered to Djordje Bjegovic, the present prime minister, or to Borislav Mikelic, Macura answered that Krajina Socialist Party members cannot nominate the new prime minister since they only have 6 seats in parliament. He added that Mikelic should have better "run as a member of parliament to see what the people think of him."

President Martic avoided answering this question in the news conference held in Knin on Friday [28 January 1994], stating that "consultations with representatives of the parties are under way." He can count on the support

of the Socialist Party and of the 15 SDS members of parliament who support the idea of united Serbian countries. As far as the eight independent members of parliament are concerned, some of them allegedly support Martic, and some Babic. Apart from that, even if he gets the votes of eight members from two small parties, he will not have the necessary majority in parliament.

Martic offering Babic the position of the prime minister and giving him the authority to form the new government in order to soothe passions has also been considered. It would be interesting if the man who was anathematized in the election campaign and almost declared an enemy of the nation became prime minister. It is very questionable, however, whether Babic would accept this offer.

Between Pale and Belgrade

There are also similar considerations among the inhabitants of Knin. A quick opinion poll carried out in the streets of Knin proved that most of the people believe that "everything will hopefully be fine." Young people avoid making comments on the election. Some people alluded to worries over their personal safety if they made comments on the election. Martic's supporters speak the language recognizable from Sarajevo Radio and Television, whereas Babic's supporters cannot explain the turn in the election results. The attitude that "everything will hopefully be fine" is understandable in the present situation, which is difficult not only because of the exhausting three-year war, but also because of the present threats from Zagreb and because of political partitions in Krajina. Apart from that, there are—for simple people—inexplicable measures from Belgrade (the Geneva agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic) and Pale (the announcement that the Serbs who live in the areas up to the Una River will be united first; the regions up to the Kupa River will follow later). Mitar Vujnovic, a 40-year-old man from the vicinity of Knin, says that "in the end, people always say what they want" and that "nothing can be decided without the people." Lazar Macura thinks, however, that political divisions have been imposed and sees the Geneva agreement as the "old Yugoslav syndrome" of making agreements "behind somebody's back," which harms Krajina.

Between the hope that "everything will hopefully be fine" and the suspicions, there remains the question of why Belgrade supported Martic. Both Babic and Martic supported the idea that all Serbian countries should unite and that the president of this newly established state should be Slobodan Milosevic. The only difference is that Martic would call this new state "Serbia, that is to say Yugoslavia," and Babic exclusively Serbia. Other election messages, which referred to defense, the economy, stamping out crime and so forth, remained at the level of the usual election phrases. Babic was presented in the campaign as the man who "only thinks of how to reach power" and who intends to "give Krajina back to Croatia," whereas Martic was given the aura of the unifier and of the most responsible man for the defense of Krajina (as if there was no Krajina Army).

Obstinate and Subordinate

Experts on Krajina think that Martic's support from Belgrade resulted from Babic's obstinacy (in his relation to Milosevic) and from Martic's subordination to Milosevic's influence (it must not be forgotten that Martic is inclined to the Communist Party-Movement for Yugoslavia). These interpretations will soon be checked. It is indicative that Vladislav Jovanovic, the minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, announced talks with his Hungarian colleague, Mr. Geza Jeszenszky. He also expressed the hope that the oil pipeline through Croatia would be opened soon, an issue that could be solved in talks between the representatives of Croatia and Krajina "after the agreement on an absolute cease-fire" is signed.

Does this mean that Minister Jovanovic already knows that such an agreement will be signed soon, in spite of the impediment that could not be removed so far—that the Croatian forces withdraw from the occupied Krajina areas. Martic cited this problem in his first address. Croatia has not agreed to this condition so far, but, in spite of that, the joint declaration was signed in Geneva and it was announced that the oil pipeline and the highway between Zagreb and Belgrade, which both run through Krajina, would be reopened.

This means that Martic is already being tested. Should there be a crisis in connection with forming the government and with the work of parliament, he could make use of the constitutional power he has as president, especially in a state of war. Apart from the considerable influence he has on the police, Martic has additionally obtained the position of the supreme commander of the Krajina Army, where he has already announced "quality changes."

[Box, p 12]

Conflict With Karadzic

Lazar Macura claims that he has never said that Radovan Karadzic is a foreign citizen, stating that this allegation comes from Sarajevo Radio and Television, which misinterpreted his statement that "it is sad that Mr. Karadzic joined the election campaign in Banija [part of Krajina] walking in company of Mr. Mile Paspalj." Macura adds that Paspalj got the least votes in the election in Glina. He also denies the stories that the police of the Republic of Serbian Krajina took away his passport and threw him off the bus because of this statement, so that he had to wait for a train in order to return to Knin.

[Box, p 12]

Unitary SDS

The SDS leadership wants to neutraiize the importance and the influence of the party through renewed attempts to create a unitary SDS before the Krajina Parliament is formed. The SDS Main Committee agreed in principal with the creation of a unitary SDS, on condition, however, that the election is completed and the new leadership in Krajina is constituted.

Personnel Changes in Internal Affairs Ministry

LD0702193594 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] This evening, President Franjo Tudjman received Internal Affairs Minister Ivan Jarnjak, together with his aides. Following the meeting a statement was issued outlining personnel changes in the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Republic of Croatia.

Under a presidential decree, Zlatko Gledec was appointed deputy internal affairs minister; Mladen Lackovic was appointed assistant internal affairs minister responsible for information and personnel; Zellko Tomljenovic, the outgoing deputy minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia, was appointed ministerial adviser.

New RSK Parliament To Convene 12 Feb

LD0702184894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1329 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—The constitutive session of the new composition of the assembly [parliament] of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] has been scheduled for 12 February, Mile Paspalj, the president of the assembly's previous composition, told the ISKRA [Krajina Serb news] agency.

ISKRA reports that the agenda of the constitutive session of the Krajina parliament includes the authentication of deputies' mandates, taking the oath by the president of the republic of Serb Krajina, and the election of the parliament president [speaker] and vice president.

Federal

Jovanovic Opposes Sanctions Against Croatia

LD0702161294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1318 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Zagreb, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—Referring to the threats of sanctions against Croatia, FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic told the Zagreb-based weekly DANAS that the FRY is against sanctions because they aggravate problems rather than resolve them.

The best example of this is Yugoslavia where the sanctions are expected "to bring peace to Bosnia but instead they have served to foment the war even further."

At the same time they have brought about destabilization not just in Yugoslavia but further afield and have "become the largest obstacle to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Jovanovic warned.

Minister Jovanovic described the recent declaration between Croatia and the FRY as a major step forward and as an obligation for both sides to use political means and a peaceful way, rather than force, in resolving future problems.

According to Jovanovic, the declaration reflects the determination on both sides to embark upon efforts to normalize relations. A joint statement from Geneva provides for an agreement to open representative offices "and not to establish diplomatic relations or to recognize each other." The declaration is only a step in that direction, Jovanovic explained.

Asked to comment on the views that since the joint declaration was based on CSCE documents and the UN Charter it indirectly implied recognition of the Republic of Croatia by the FRY, Jovanovic said that "one should not look for something that is not in the agreement."

He added that this agreement "prejudges none of the outstanding issues including Krajina, the division of assets, mutual recognition or even full diplomatic relations." When conditions are ripe these issues will be settled, the federal foreign minister stressed.

We must bear in mind that the issue of Krajina is part of the Vance plan which stipulates that its political future and status must be resolved through direct negotiations between legitimate representatives of Krajina and the Republic of Croatia. Our agreement in Geneva is conducive to negotiations on these issues. The fact is that we have opened a process likely to increase the chances for exchanging political visits and establishing political contacts directly without mediators. This is a natural course to be pursued by two countries that want to settle their bilateral relations without "foreign middlemen."

The coming visit by FRY Federal Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic to Zagreb is a step in this direction. This visit will most likely be followed by a visit to Belgrade by the Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister [Mate Granic]. Contacts of a different kind at an even higher level are also a possibility, Jovanovic said.

Jovanovic Hopes Massacre Will Expedite Talks

AU0702160894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Interview with FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Dragan Colovic; place and date not given —recorded]

[Text] [Jovanovic] In whose interest could it possibly be to commit such a horrendous crime, and what can somebody who might be interested in such a crime expect from it? In this respect, we must clearly see that the Serbian side is definitely not the one that harbors any interest in prolonging the crisis and even less in complicating and deteriorating it further by producing such horrendous pictures of war. The perpetrators should be sought among those who have been, even so far, staunch opponents of the peace process or the factors that on several occasions did everything they could to postpone, prolong, or thwart this process.

In any case, the investigation, which we expect to be meticulous and objective, should establish not merely the physical executor, but also the side that was behind the executor, that appears as the chief obstruction to the progress toward peace. Understandably, all this could have been avoided and we would not have needed to watch all these pictures of war—neither the less bloody ones nor these most horrific ones—had the peace that was so readily on offer for acceptance in Geneva been accepted wholeheartedly by those who care about peace.

[Colovic] Mr. Minister, can this event influence, and to what extent, the ways of the further resolution of the crisis in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and also on the territories of former Yugoslavia?

[Jovanovic] You see, with its drama and dimensions, this horrendous crime can be misused by the opponents of peace to further endanger the peace process and justify the policy of force, that is to say, the war option as the only way out of this situation.

On the other hand this terrible accident can act as a last warning to all who have maintained a reasonable approach toward the Bosnian crisis, namely, that the postponement of peace is no longer counterproductive, but also criminal, and that we must concentrate on the peace process and bring it to an end in one or two swipes.

I hope, we hope, that the voices of sobriety and responsibility will prevail and that this accident will, at the same time, be the last large-scale accident in this war and that a lesson will be learned from all this that will expedite the peace process and bring it to a finale as soon as possible.

Joint Border Commission With Albania Proposed

LD0402140694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1321 GMT 4 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 4 Feb (TANJUG)—Following the latest incidents on the border between Yugoslavia and Albania, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued the following statement:

"As the Yugoslav public is aware, the number of incidents on the Yugoslav-Albanian border, in which several Albanian citizens regrettably lost their lives while attempting to illegally cross into Yugoslavia, has recently increased.

"In order to discuss additional measures that could be taken, in the spirit of respect for the international and bilateral obligations that both countries have undertaken to prevent border incidents, the Yugoslav side has recently proposed to the relevant Albanian bodies that an extraordinary session of the main joint Yugoslav-Albanian commission for border incidents be held in Belgrade."

The statement goes on to say: "The normalization of relations on the Yugoslav-Albanian border would improve relations between the two countries, which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, adhering to the principles of good-neighborliness, has as its lasting goal."

Serbia

Milosevic Discusses Bosnia With UN Officials

LD0702195094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1919 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 7 (TANJUG)—President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and head of the UNPROFOR mission Yasushi Akashi in Belgrade on Monday assessed that the signing of a peace agreement accounted for the most efficient way to end the war in the ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Present at the talks also were UNPROFOR Commander for Bosnia General Michael Rose, special envoy of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Nicholas Morris, and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic.

The signing of a peace agreement would avert or discourage the forces opting for continued war, it was assessed at the talks.

The evasion of a peace agreement by war option protagonists, assisted by foreign factors, can only flare up war conflicts bearing heavy consequences om regional peace and stability, it was cautioned at the talks.

On Sunday, the Moslem side rejected a draft accord on lasting truce in the Sarajevo region as drawn up by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Asushi Yakashi. The Moslems also turned down a peace plan by the European Union (E.U.) in Geneva twenty days ago, opting for war and trying to win out military intervention against Bosnian Serbs.

A resumption of political talks, to which the Serb side commits itself and on which the international community would have to insist strongly, is the only rasonable road to peace, it was said at the talks.

It was pointed out that Serbia, as it has been doing so far, would lend support to peace efforts by the United Nations in the areas of former Yugoslavia.

Akashi, Rose Comment on Talks

AU0702213694 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Statements by Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of the UN secretary general for the former Yugoslavia, and General Michael Rose, UN Protection Forces commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, after talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade on 7 February; all questions and answers are in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian—recorded]

[Text] [Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Akashi, how do you assess the talks with President Milosevic and what was the purpose of your visit?

[Akashi] For me, this was an opportunity to discuss all essential questions, promote peace, and reduce tensions in the region for which I am responsible. It was a good, business-like discussion on numerous concrete issues.

[Unidentified correspondent] Could you be more specific, please?

[Akashi] Yes. We discussed the development of the situation in Sarajevo. We also discussed the issue of Srebrenica and Tuzla. We discussed ways to improve the humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina and also the normalization of relations between Serbia and Croatia. Therefore, the talks touched upon numerous issues.

[Unidentified correspondent] Was Milosevic in favor of Sarajevo's demilitarization?

[Akashi] Yes, he truly hopes for progress on the issue of UN administration of Sarajevo and the town's demilitarization, even before the peace agreement is reached.

[Unidentified correspondent] I have a question for Michael Rose. Do you hold any new information about the explosion in Sarajevo?

[Rose] Which one are you referring to?

[Unidentified correspondent] The bomb that fell on Saturday, it is impossible to say where it came from. However, some people already accuse the Serbs.

[Rose] We base our assessments on technical analyses.

[Unidentified correspondent] General, how would you comment on such a destructive effect of only one mortar bomb?

[Rose] The destruction was great for one bomb alone. The reason that it occurred is that it landed on a market stall at waist height. For this reason, the effect was to devastating.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Akashi, what do you think is the future of the Geneva talks?

[Akashi] President Milosevic assured me that the talks on 10 February will be held and that topics of interest will be discussed by the three sides.

[Unidentified correspondent] How do you comment on possible air strikes against the positions of the Bosnian Serbs?

[Akashi] I believe that the NATO Council will examine the question of air strikes in relation to the proposal by the UN secretary general.

[Unidentified correspondent] What will your report to the UN Security Council contain regarding the present situation?

[Akashi] I will inform the UN Security Council about the reports and findings that I have already sent to New York. My latest report, of yesterday, referred to an immediate and total cease-fire. We will continue with our efforts even though there have been no results so far as a cease-fire would be extremely useful to reduce tensions and prevent tragedies like the ones we have seen in Sarajevo in the last few days.

[Unidentified correspondent] Are you worried that if strikes do take place this will escalate the entire matter?

[Akashi] I believe that everybody is definitely worried about the consequences of any sort of air strikes.

[Unidentified correspondent] Are you worried for UN troops in Bosnia now?

[Akashi] We are worried about many things, yes. O.K.? Thank you very much. [end recording]

Jovanovic Calls Talks 'Promising'

AU0702205794 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Interview with FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Snezana Rodic and unidentified correspondent in Belgrade on 7 February—recorded]

[Text] Mr. Jovanovic, how do you assess today's [Milosevic-Akashi] talks?

[Jovanovic] I view them as encouraging, especially after what has happened recently. Namely, it is evident that the efforts to overcome the present situation and steer it back on the negotiating path to find a solution by political means in peace are again gaining in prominence. It is evident that Mr. Akashi is a man of peace, dialogue, and negotiations, and not a man of confrontation, threats, ultimatums, or punishment. On the other hand, the entire situation, despite this tragic event, contains elements of political dynamism [sentence as heard]. For example, Lord Owen and President Karadzic yesterday held very enterprising talks about Sarajevo and its placement under the UN administration without waiting for the final peace settlement. On the other hand, there is talk about the relaxation of the situation in Sarajevo itself, which is also encouraging. There has been some progress in the talks concerning Tuzla airport.

A meeting in Geneva is forthcoming at which, beside the examination of the measures of trust, the issue of Sarajevo in the above mentioned context should also be discussed. Finally, a meeting of the neighboring countries of the former Yugoslavia at a ministerial level will also probably take place, which means that the political momentum has been preserved despite all the temptations and we should expect further development in this direction rather than in the direction of confrontation and escalation of the war.

[Unidentified reporter, in English with superimposed simultaneous translation into Serbo-Croatian] Mr. Minister how do you assess the danger of air attacks on the Serbian positions in Bosnia. Is this possible?

[Jovanovic, in English with superimposed simultaneous translation into Serbo-Croatian] I believe that this is possible in this war, but not likely, I hope, because everybody is aware that this would not help in the present situation and definitely would not assist the peace process. First of all, the strain of the entire situation and the solution to the crisis can only be seen within the framework of the peace process and not in the possibility of escalating the conflict further. Finally, political activities, a visit by Mr. Akashi and the cochairmen not merely to Belgrade, but to some other counties in this region are the best proof that the majority of the international community believes that a political and not a military solution is needed here. We are definitely inclined to believe that the solution to the problem lies in the rejection of the existing structure of political negotiations.

[Unidentified reporter, in English with superimposed simultaneous translation into Serbo-Croatian] Do you foresee what will happen in Geneva?

[Jovanovic, in English with superimposed simultaneous translation into Serbo-Croatian] If it were up to us, peace can take place anytime. The lack of peace will depend upon the side that has been opposed to peace. Unfortunately, this side is still not in a mood to assist the peace. They prefer to obstruct the peace, however, there are chances that even this side might turn more cooperative in comparison to the readiness of the majority of the international community to assist the peace process and not the continuation of the war.

Owen Discusses Meeting With Milosevic

LD0702164994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1619 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 7 (TANJUG)—Co-chairman of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia David Owen said here Monday that nobody wanted air strikes on artillery positions around Sarajevo, the capital of the war-shattered former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Only someone who is crazy could want these air strikes, Owen said adding however that the present situation in which so many people were being killed, like in Sarajevo on Saturday, could no longer be tolerated. He made this statement after his meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic Monday.

The mortar shell, fired Saturday from positions still undetermined by UNPROFOR, killed 68 and injured almost 200 persons.

Owen described as extremely important his meeting with Milosevic which was also attended by the second co-chairman on the conference of the former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic.

One of the main topics discussed was the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ways of ending it, as well as ways of preventing tragedies like the one that happened in Sarajevo on Saturday, Lord Owen said.

In answer to questions about air strikes Owen said he favoured negotiations and expressed hope that through negotiations steps would be adopted to prevent tragedies like the one in Sarajevo.

Concerning his talks Sunday evening with the president of the Bosnian Serb Republic Radovan Karadzic Owen said that Karadzic accepted the proposal to negotiate about the demilitarization of Sarajevo and its placement under a two-year UN administration.

Lord Owen announced that the talks on Sarajevo set for Thursday would discuss confidence-building measures and not the global peace settlement for the Bosnian crisis.

Comments on Possible Air Strikes

AU0702220994 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Interview with Lord David Owen, cochairman of the conference on former Yugoslavia, by Zoran Jevdjovic after talks with Serbian President Milosevic in Belgrade on 7 February; in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian—recorded]

[Text] [Owen] We really must be very quick because I must arrive in Brussels to attend the meeting of the European Union foreign ministers.

We had very useful and important talks with the president [Milosevic]. We discussed regional issues, as well as the issue of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the ways to avoid tragedies like the one that occurred in Sarajevo.

[Jevdjovic] It has been reported that Butrus-Ghali had sought authorization for the use of air strikes. Are we any closer to these air strikes now?

[Owen] I hope that through the negotiations we will be able to avoid tragedies like the one that had happened in Sarajevo. Last night in Zvornik, Mr. Stoltenberg and I received Dr. Karadzic's consent that he would negotiate with the UN administration on the demilitarization of Sarajevo. Therefore, we can make progress. Mr. Akashi and the UN generals will try to find an agreement on military steps that are necessary to ensure a true ceasefire and demilitarization in phases. We are negotiating, and we hope that this can be accomplished.

Only an idiot wants the air strikes. On the other hand, only idiots can further tolerate the situation in which many people are losing their lives, as in Sarajevo on Saturday. This is a question of a sensible solution. The way I understood the letter from the UN secretary general, he is seeking the authorization of the NATO Council. Let us recall that NATO is supposed to follow UN policy. The United Nations does not want to be a warring side but wants to remain objective. However, it must protect the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] and the UNPROFOR mandate. Namely, UNPROFOR has a mandate in relations to Sarajevo, which is to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and the infantry attacks and clashes on the lines of contact.

The Bosnian Government Army and the army of the Bosnian Serbs should sign an agreement that would deal with both problems, the situation regarding the infantry, the situation on the field, and the situation regarding heavy arms around Sarajevo.

[Jevdjovic] Did Mr. Karadzic agree to the project of Sarajevo's demilitarization?

[Owen] Yes, he is willing to negotiate with the UN administration. We hope that this will be discussed in detail with the United Nations on a daily basis. This should have happened yesterday. It could appear on the agenda of the meeting dedicated to the measures of trust, which is scheduled to take place in Geneva on Thursday [10 February]. The Thursday meeting in Geneva is not a meeting on a global peace solution. If something like this happens and it is discussed, then fine, but it is a meeting dedicated to the measures of trust.

Organizations Warn Against NATO Air Strikes

LD0702135494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1209 GMT 7 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 7 Feb (TANJUG)—The White Rose and the New Byzantium-Orthodox Concord today

warned the NATO Council that if Bosnian Serbs positions were attacked, these nongovernmental organizations would mount a "complete and total" blockade of the Danube "for a one-year period."

It is noted in a statement signed by Radomir Smiljanic, president of the White Rose and of the Danube Blockade Council, that "we all genuinely and deeply mourn the innocent victims of Sarajevo, but at the same time we wish to draw attention to the fact that for the fourth time the unscrupulous propaganda machine of the Bosnian Muslim government and world agents have used the same trick."

"The suffering of the innocent is used to move the world public and NATO's military power against the Serbs and to undermine the Geneva peace process," the statement says and goes on to warn the NATO Council "under no circumstances to take military action or mount air strikes against the Serbs in former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Macedonia

Party of Serbs Demands Constitutional Recognition

AU0702163194 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 7 Feb 94

[Unattributed report: "Serbs Must Be Included in the Constitution"]

[Text] The newly appointed leadership of the Democratic Party of the Serbs in Macedonia (DPS) denies the report signed by the party's ex-president Boro Ristic and by the Macedonian Internal Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, saying the Serbian people does not accept that signature. For the new DPS leader, Dragisa Miletic, the way chosen by the Serbian people is much more agreeable—they demand an explicit constitutional recognition of the Serbs, as a guarantee of their equal rights with all other minorities in Macedonia. In other words, the Macedonian Government is to include the Serbs in its official list of minorities in the country, in 18 months. Otherwise, the next step of DPS will be raising of the Serbian question in Macedonia in front of international institutions, Miletic said.

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